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Foreword 
This paper is one of a series of studies commissioned by the International Labour Office (ILO) 
in 2015, under a project entitled “Post-crisis social dialogue: Good practices in the EU-28”, which 
is implemented by the ILO with funding from the European Union (EU). The project documents 
and analyzes emerging trends and good practices in social dialogue and industrial relations in EU 
Member States. The project focuses specifically on developments since 2013, as countries began 
to exit the crisis, and examines the role played by social dialogue in promoting sustainable 
reforms and job-rich inclusive growth.  
 
The research component involved eleven in-depth country studies carried out by reputed national 
scholars, as well as the drafting of a comparative analysis. Summaries of the draft papers were 
presented and discussed at a tripartite knowledge-sharing conference, organized at the Palais du 
Luxembourg in Paris on 20 May, 2016.  The conference brought together national and 
international stakeholders, including government ministers and high-level officials, 
representatives of employers’ and workers’ organizations and of regional and international 
organizations, including the ILO and EU institutions such as the European Commission, the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and Eurofound. Participants discussed recent 
developments in the industrial relations landscape and exchanged experiences of social dialogue 
in the ‘post-crisis’ period. Following the conference, the country studies were revised. Final 
versions of the country summary reports and the overview chapter are to be published by the ILO 
in a peer-reviewed, edited volume in late 2016.   
 
This study by Oscar Molina and Fausto Miguélez (of the Autonomous University of Barcelona) 
examines the challenges facing tripartite social dialogue in Spain and its potential for 
revitalization following the timid steps taken by successive governments and the social partners. 
The authors contrast this situation to the resilience of bipartite social dialogue between trade 
unions and employer organizations, and the positive contribution it made to coordinating 
collective bargaining through this difficult economic and political period. The report highlights 
a number of good practices in seeking to re-launch tripartite social dialogue, including a 2014 
Declaration of Intent signed by trade unions, employers’ organizations and the government, and 
a pact on employment activation policies for the long-term unemployed. These achievements are 
promising, although additional efforts are needed to fully revitalize social dialogue and contribute 
to a stronger economic and labour market recovery. The paper considers also the role of social 
dialogue in key policy issues such as labour market and pension reforms, and the formulation and 
implementation of National Reform Programmes in the context of the European Semester.  
 
The responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with its authors and its 
publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office or the 
European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moussa Oumarou 
Director 
Governance and Tripartism Department 
International Labour Office, Geneva 
Youcef Ghellab 
Head, Social Dialogue and Tripartism Unit 
Governance and Tripartism Department 
International Labour Office, Geneva 
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Introduction 
Since the return of democracy, tripartite social dialogue in Spain has exhibited three main 
characteristics. First, it has developed outside institutional mechanisms, such as the tripartite 
Economic and Social Council. Second, it has mostly dealt with labour market and social 
policy (mostly old-age pension) issues, hence adopting a strong distributional character and 
having little impact on general economic policy making, except in the early 1980s. Finally, 
and as a consequence of the above, it has been discontinued depending on the economic 
cycle and, to a lesser extent, the political leaning of the governing party (Espina, 1999). 
These three interlinked features have been exacerbated as a consequence of the recent 
economic crisis and contribute to explaining the collapse of tripartite social dialogue in 
recent years. But, following this abandonment, the crisis has also given rise to new tensions 
and obstacles to a healthy recovery of tripartite social dialogue. First, the tightening of fiscal 
rules and the macroeconomic surveillance mechanisms have severely limited the margin of 
manoeuvre of governments, even in a post-crisis recovery scenario. Second, the democratic 
and institutional crisis has also affected the social partners, which has further reduced the 
incentive for governments to involve them in policy making (Molina and Miguélez, 2013; 
Culpepper and Regan, 2014). As a consequence, the prospects for a revitalization of tripartite 
social dialogue in the post-crisis period are currently very weak.  
Compared to previous episodes of economic downturn, in which social dialogue was also 
under stress but ultimately accompanied the recovery, on this occasion it is struggling to 
achieve revitalization. This is even more worrying given the very negative socio-economic 
impact of the crisis in terms of the persistently high (long-term) unemployment rate, the 
extension of precarious employment and the rise in inequality. Under such conditions, the 
contribution of tripartite social dialogue to a socially sustainable recovery is even more 
crucial. Social dialogue should be a key governance mechanism for the consolidation of a 
strong and inclusive recovery.  
The analysis of post-crisis social dialogue in this report, however, shows that Spain is still 
far from this scenario. Despite the economic and labour market recovery, tripartite social 
dialogue remains very weak and has been limited to a declaration of intent signed by trade 
unions, employers’ organizations and Government in July 2014, and a narrow agreement on 
activation policies for the long-term unemployed in December of the same year. Following 
the abandonment of tripartite social dialogue in November 2011, very little was done to 
restore it, and the few steps taken more recently cannot be considered as a turning point. A 
long-term process of narrowing of the issues discussed and negotiated through tripartite 
social dialogue has also contributed to its detachment from economic policy making. In this 
respect, the European Semester and the negotiation and implementation of National Reform 
Programmes have not offered an opportunity to strengthen tripartite social dialogue. On the 
contrary, the low level of involvement of the social partners has exacerbated mutual distrust 
and the polarization of views on economic policy making, making it even more difficult to 
rely upon social dialogue in the recovery. 
Moreover, the position of National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDI) has been weakened 
in the context of the economic and financial crisis. On the one hand, their narrow advisory 
role has opened up a debate on whether or not they should be retained, with some voices 
pointing to a need for reform, including through an extension of their role and the inclusion 
of new actors (Plataforma Tercer Sector, 2015). On the other, austerity policies combined 
with public administration reforms have led to the suppression of many economic and social 
councils at the regional level. 
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The erosion of the regulatory role of collective bargaining, its weaker capacity to protect 
workers’ rights as well as its lower governability, have not contributed to restoring social 
dialogue in the post-crisis period. In addition to the gradual narrowing of the scope of social 
dialogue, the policy area in which trade unions and employers do retain some autonomy has 
been unilaterally modified by the government, thereby further reducing the incentive for 
governments to involve the social partners. As a result, their role in macroeconomic 
governance has been further eroded.  
In this situation, the reactions of trade unions and employers’ organizations have varied. 
There were attempts to restore part of the autonomy of collective bargaining lost as a result 
of unilateral government regulation through bipartite social dialogue. Both trade unions and 
employers have an interest in maintaining their institutional position in the collective 
bargaining system and, as a consequence, have developed autonomous mechanisms to 
enhance its coordination and governability. In view of the difficulties encountered in 
negotiating with the Government, trade unions tried other ways to make their voices heard, 
for instance by proposing a Popular Legislative Initiative to Parliament in April 2015 on a 
minimum guaranteed income. So despite using social dialogue as the main channel for their 
demands, they have looked for alternative mechanisms to influence policy. There has also 
been some movement within the main employers’ organization, the Spanish Confederation 
of Employers’ Organizations (CEOE), on behalf of a group of large companies, which has 
created an autonomous platform to lobby the Government. 
The methodology for the study consisted of several research methods and sources. First, 
secondary sources were used, including articles in academic journals and books. Newspaper 
articles helped to reconstruct social dialogue processes in greater detail. Primary sources 
included documents from trade unions, employers’ organizations and tripartite bodies; 
National Reform Programmes and other government documents; and parliamentary debates. 
Quantitative sources shed light on the macroeconomic context, labour market developments 
and industrial relations. The sources are both national (particularly in the case of industrial 
relations indicators) and European. Finally, interviews were conducted with the social 
partners, experts, government representatives and European Semester Officers. The 
interviews were carried out between June and October 2015 in Madrid and Barcelona. 
Interviews conducted in 2012 for the project “Promoting a balanced and inclusive recovery 
from the crisis in Europe through sound industrial relations and social dialogue”   were also 
drawn upon. Finally, the present project benefited from interviews conducted between 
September 2014 and June 2015 for the Project “Diagnóstico Socioeconómico sobre las 
Políticas de Empleo en España 2012-2014”. (“Socio-economic analysis of employment 
policies in Spain, 2012-14”).  A list of the interviews is contained in the Annex. 
This report is organized in five sections. The first sets out the macroeconomic and 
institutional scenario for the analysis of social dialogue in the post-crisis period. This 
includes a discussion of social dialogue around key policy issues, such as the labour market 
and pensions, as well as the formulation and implementation of National Reform 
Programmes in the context of the European Semester. The second section analyses the role 
of national social dialogue in the post-crisis period, while also highlighting the impact the 
crisis had on its functioning. Section three examines the impact of the crisis on such aspects 
of collective bargaining as coordination and structure, including a discussion of post-crisis 
developments. Section four analyses the impact of the crisis on the labour market and 
industrial relations, followed by a discussion of the most recent trends in the post-crisis 
period. Section five presents conclusions. 
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Section I. Industrial relations and the macroeconomic framework 
1.1 Persistence of old problems and imbalances 
In relation to the macroeconomic framework, it is important first to note the disagreement 
among the experts consulted concerning the adequacy of the term “post-crisis” to define the 
new context. Even though GDP growth has been positive since the last quarter of 2013, and 
this has been accompanied by some growth in employment and a timid fall in total 
unemployment, there remain too many macroeconomic imbalances and labour market 
problems to be able to talk of the crisis as being in the past. 
Just before the crisis, the picture was very different. Spain had experienced an unprecedented 
period of growth, almost uninterrupted since the mid-1990s. As a result, the unemployment 
rate had fallen from 22 per cent in 1994 to a record low of 8.2 per cent in 2007. At the same 
time, the employment rate reached a record high 65.8 per cent in 2007. As a result of the 
favourable economic conditions, there was a 2.2 per cent GDP budget surplus in 2006, and 
Government debt fell to 35.5 per cent of GDP. Under these conditions, Spain seemed to be 
in a better position than other countries to face the economic crisis.  
However, despite the apparent good health of the Spanish economy, a number of imbalances 
meant that it was a “giant with feet of clay” (Carrasco, 2014). The most important was related 
to the housing bubble, and particularly the over-indebtedness of the population due to cheap 
access to credit (Ortega y Peñalosa, 2015). There were two other related weaknesses of the 
Spanish economy. The first was the important role of the construction sector in the economy 
and in total employment, accounting for over 15 per cent of total employment in terms of 
direct jobs. The second was the high exposure of the banking sector to an economic 
downturn. Moreover, there had been a deterioration in the balance of payments, and 
particularly in the trade deficit, as a result of the increase in imports and the rise in real unit 
labour costs above the EU average. An economic structure based on high labour intensive 
sectors and low labour productivity (see Figure 2 below) made the Spanish economy 
vulnerable to competition from emerging economies.  
The boom years preceding the crisis, and particularly since 2004, when the left-wing 
Zapatero government was elected, coincided with a period of heightened social dialogue 
(Molina and Rhodes, 2011), during which the trade unions and employers were actively 
involved in the negotiation of several reforms and were consulted on many issues, including 
the labour market, industrial relations and pensions. The rapid deterioration in economic and 
labour market conditions following the onset of the crisis, with the required adjustments, 
were followed by an abandonment of social dialogue. Several reasons may be put forward 
to explain these trends (Molina and Miguélez, 2013), but the limited scope for political 
exchange between governments and the social partners is certainly important. Moreover, the 
external pressure to adopt rapid and specific fiscal adjustments also limited the space for 
social dialogue. 
Since the last quarter of 2013, economic conditions have started to show some signs of 
improvement. In terms of GDP growth, Figure 1 shows that the recovery has relied on good 
export performance of goods and services, partly due to the internal devaluation process. 
Private domestic demand has remained stagnant, hence contributing very little to the 
recovery. Even though this could a priori be taken as a sign of structural change in the type 
of growth, the reality is that tourism and its related activities (such as hotels and restaurants) 
have been one of the most dynamic sectors in terms of employment creation and growth, 
followed by retail trade and construction (Miguélez et al., 2015). These were also the sectors 
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leading growth in the pre-crisis years, thus suggesting that the structural problems remain. 
Falling growth prospects in the euro area and Latin America may therefore have a strong 
downward impact on the Spanish economy in the coming months. At the same time, the 
Government deficit remains high, at 5.9 per cent in 2014, and public debt has grown steadily, 
rising from 35.5 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 99.3 per cent in 2014.  
Figure 1: Demand components of GDP, 2000-2014 
 
Source: Eurostat 
One of the main problems of the Spanish economy in the pre-crisis years was the low level 
of labour productivity resulting from a growth regime based on labour intensive and low 
productivity sectors. Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, there has been an 
increase in productivity (see Figure 2). However, this trend is explained, not by a structural 
change in production and the shift towards less labour intensive and high productivity 
sectors, but simply by a faster decline in employment compared to GDP growth. The 
negative growth experienced in nominal unit labour costs has therefore contributed to 
improved external cost competitiveness, but without delivering a long-term shift in 
production methods or sectors. 
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Figure 2: Real labour productivity and nominal unit labour costs, growth rates, 2000-2014 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
The second main characteristic of the recovery is related to the type and quality of the 
employment created. As shown in Figure 3, the crisis triggered a fall in temporary 
employment, which is by definition the first area of employment destruction in the event of 
economic slowdown. This was accompanied by an increase in part-time employment, most 
of it involuntary. The rise in part-time work responds to an employer strategy to cut labour 
costs and explains the increase in the number of “working poor”, who rose from 10.2 per 
cent of those employed to 12.6 per cent in 2014. Some analysts have shown how part-time 
workers, and particularly women part-time workers, have experienced a significant wage 
disadvantage (Ramos et al., 2015). Finally, self-employment has remained fairly stable 
during the crisis.  
Figure 3: Temporary employment, part-time employment and self-employment, 2000-2014 
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Even though the unemployment rate has fallen since 2014, it nevertheless remains at a very 
high level. More importantly, long-term unemployment increased very rapidly and is not 
showing any downward trend (see Figure 4). That is why many observers and some of those 
interviewed are sceptical about the term “post-crisis”. As pointed out recently by Stiglitz, “a 
two-speed economy with a 25 per cent unemployment rate cannot engage in a sustainable 
recovery”. 1  The high long-term unemployment rate is even more worrying when account is 
taken of the cuts in active labour market policy measures and the fall in unemployment 
protection coverage (Miguélez et al., 2015). In other words, many of the long-term 
unemployed have severe employability problems and, because of the lower level of 
resources for both active and passive employment policies, they face enormous difficulties 
not only in finding a job, but also in achieving a decent standard of living. 
Figure 4: Unemployment and long-term unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                            Source: Eurostat 
1.2 Social dialogue and the overhaul of the industrial relations landscape  
A bad and late diagnosis of the challenges facing the economy in the early months of the 
crisis, resulting in costly and largely ineffective policies, not only hampered the recovery, 
but also aggravated the conditions that Spain had to face during the sovereign debt crisis 
from 2010 onwards (Molina and Godino, 2013). The polarization that characterizes the 
Spanish political situation has also made it difficult to reach a broad political and socio-
economic consensus, thus limiting the effectiveness of policy responses during both the 
crisis and the post-crisis period. 
Analysis of social dialogue in the crisis and post-crisis periods needs to be interpreted in the 
light of a deep and multifaceted crisis of the democratic system (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014). 
On the one hand, the crisis has triggered an increase in the belief by citizens that it is 
necessary to reform the political system, which is considered undemocratic, both in terms of 
institutions and the functioning and representativeness of political parties. The social 
partners, and particularly the trade unions, have also been the subject of criticism by a broad 
sector of society, including the 15-M and ‘indignados’ movements, which have accused 
them of not offering an alternative model and of accommodating the policies of both the 
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People’s Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) due to their high 
degree of institutionalization and dependence on State resources (Barranco and Molina, 
2014). The two major labour confederations have acknowledged the failure of trade unions 
to channel the demands of citizens as part of the institutional and political system. 2  As a 
consequence, confidence in trade unions in Spain fell significantly during the crisis (see 
Figure 5). Political discontent has been aggravated by the perceived imposition of fiscal 
adjustment by the technocratic European Union (EU). Moreover, the negative impact of the 
crisis and the fiscal adjustment required for social cohesion have threatened the stability and 
pillars of the democratic system developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
‘indignados’ movement therefore needs to be interpreted as an expression of political and 
economic discontent (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2011). 
Figure 5: Confidence in trade unions, Spain, 2006-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 
Adjustment policies have been characterized by a fairly broadly shared diagnosis of the 
problems affecting the Spanish economy but significant differences regarding the policies 
required to deal with them. Following an initial period of inaction, the first phase in the 
response to the crisis consisted of fiscal stimulus, which was then followed by a shift towards 
austerity measures combining spending cuts and tax increases. This change only occurred 
once the risk of contagion of the Greek sovereign debt crisis became evident in early to mid-
2010. In this regard, there was continuity of economic policy between the late Socialist 
(2010-2011) and PP (2011 onwards) administrations (Molina and Godino, 2013). The major 
shift in economic policy was prompted externally, and was not the result of the different 
political leanings of the administration. However, in comparison with the Socialist 
administration, spending cuts have been more concentrated on education and health since 
the PP administration came to power in November 2012. A tight fiscal policy has been 
maintained, with some relaxation only since 2014. In this context, the budget for 2016, 
 
2  See: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/economia/1348047099.html 
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approved in the summer of 2015, has been criticized for being too optimistic in relation to 
the macroeconomic scenario for 2016, with a risk of non-compliance with the deficit target. 3  
The role and impact of social dialogue in the adjustment measures adopted has varied over 
time and across policy fields. First, there was some discontinuity between the pre-debt and 
the sovereign debt crisis, aggravated by the November 2011 change from a left to a right-
wing administration. The Socialist administration maintained talks and permanent contact 
with the social partners on a large number of issues, including the labour market, industrial 
relations and employment, industrial, energy and environmental policy. However, all the 
actors involved judged the outcomes of this process to be disappointing. No major tripartite 
agreement was concluded between 2008 and 2010. The debt crisis placed further pressure 
on the Socialist administration to take action, which led to a more unilateral approach to 
regulating several policy fields, even though it maintained respect for tripartite dialogue with 
the social partners preceding the labour market and industrial relations reforms. Finally, the 
right-wing administration elected in November 2011 has adopted a more unilateral approach, 
allowing no space for tripartite social dialogue. This has changed only marginally since July 
2014 when, for the first time, the trade unions, employers’ organizations and the Government 
signed an agreement containing a plan for tripartite negotiations over the following months. 
1.3 Social dialogue during the debt crisis and recovery 
Three different periods can be distinguished in tripartite social dialogue since the beginning 
of the financial and economic crisis (see Table 1): 
 2008-2009: the period of the stimulus response in 2008-2009 was characterized by 
significant involvement of the social partners, although with few results in terms of 
agreements signed.  
 2010-2013: the 2010 debt crisis led to the adoption of a more unilateral approach to 
policy making, with less room for social partnership. The only exception was the 
January 2011 Tripartite Social and Economic Agreement. The centre-right Rajoy 
government elected in November 2011 maintained the unilateral approach to policy 
making. The erosion of social dialogue not only affected its tripartite dimension, but 
also bipartite relations between trade unions and employers’ organizations.  
 2014-2015: more recently, with the first signs of economic recovery in 2014, there 
has been a timid recovery of tripartite and bipartite social dialogue, although it remains 
very fragmented and discontinuous.  
  
 
3  See the European Commission opinion of 12 October 2015 on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Spain: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/dbp/2015/es_2015-10-
12_co_en.pdf 
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Table 1: Social dialogue and unilateral reforms in Spain (economy, financial stability and the labour 
market), 2008-2015  
July 2018 Memorandum of Understanding for the 
Recovery of the Economy, Employment, 
Competitiveness and Social Progress 
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the 
Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions 
(CCOO), the General Union of Workers (UGT), the 
Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organizations 
(CEOE) and the Government 
September 2009 Agreement for the public sector between the 
trade unions and the Government 2010-2012 
Agreement signed between CCOO, UGT, the 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions and Public 
Servants (CSIF) and the Government 
January 2010 Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2010-2012 (AENC 
I) 
Bipartite agreement signed between CCOO, UGT and 
CEOE containing guidelines for collective agreements 
January 2010 Plan for Immediate Action 2010 No consultation or negotiations between the social 
partners and the Government 
May 2010 Austerity Plan for the Public Sector 2011-
2013 
No consultation or negotiations between the social 
partners and the Government 
June - September 
2010 
Labour market reform Tripartite negotiations failed. The Government acted 
unilaterally 
December 2010 Industrial Policy Programme (PIN) 2020 The Government consulted the social partners on some 
of the contents, but their involvement was limited 
January 2011 Social and Economic Agreement on 
pensions, labour market and collective 
bargaining 
Tripartite Social Pact signed by CCOO, UGT, CEOE and 
the Government 
March 2011 Act on the sustainable economy The Government consulted the social partners on some 
of the contents, but their involvement was limited 
June 2011 Reform of collective bargaining Tripartite negotiations failed and the Government took 
unilateral action 
January 2012 Interconfederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining (AENC II) 
Bipartite agreement: guidelines for collective agreements 
March 2012 Labour market reform No consultation or negotiations with the social partners. 
Adopted unilaterally by the Government. 
July 2014 Proposals for tripartite negotiations to 
strengthen economic growth and employment 
Tripartite agreement with no specific policy content. It is a 
declaration of intent for future negotiations 
December 2014 Plan for employment activation Tripartite agreement 
March 2015 Reform of vocational training Unilateral regulation by the Government after negotiations 
with the social partners failed 
July 2015 Interconfederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2015-2016-2017 
(AENC III) 
Bipartite agreement containing guidelines for collective 
bargaining 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
Before entering into detailed analysis of social dialogue during the crisis and post-crisis 
periods, it is important to note the document that provided the general orientations on the 
content and form of social dialogue since 2004, the Declaration for Social Dialogue 2004: 
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Competitiveness, Stable Employment and Social Cohesion, 4  which was agreed soon after 
Zapatero was first elected in 2004. The agenda for negotiations agreed in 2004 was widened 
in July 2008 before the onset of the worrying economic and labour market situation. A 
Memorandum of Understanding for the Promotion of the Economy, Employment, 
Competitiveness and Social Progress was signed in July 2008 by the social partners and the 
executive to boost employment and broaden the social dialogue agenda to other issues, 
including industrial and energy policy. 5  At the same time, the social partners and the 
Government decided in January 2009 to intensify talks with a view to speeding up the 
process of concluding an agreement on collective bargaining in light of the rapidly 
worsening economic situation.  
In May 2009, a meeting between the social partners and the Government concluded with a 
commitment to reach an agreement by July that year. Two types of measures would be 
negotiated, as laid down in a joint UGT–CCOO document containing proposals for an 
agreement on employment and social protection. 6 The first were short-term employment 
policy measures aimed at alleviating the effects of the economic crisis by reducing working 
time without destroying more jobs and at enhancing unemployment protection. The second 
were longer-term measures aimed at developing a more sustainable and inclusive growth 
model. It was not finally possible to conclude an agreement due to the demand made by the 
employers for a 5 per cent reduction in employer social security contributions and other 
measures related to collective redundancies. Notwithstanding this failure, social dialogue 
delivered an agreement in September 2009 on civil service and public sector employment 
for the period 2010-2012. 7  
The perception of social dialogue as a mechanism to govern the response to the economic 
crisis and austerity policies changed significantly with the onset of the sovereign debt crisis 
in 2010. At a meeting in March 2009, the Socialist administration proposed an initiative to 
relaunch and give momentum to social dialogue and concerted action as a means of 
generating economic growth and trust and of overcoming the crisis. The initiative was 
supported by the PP. 8 However, the debt crisis and external pressures on the executive to 
take action without awaiting the results of social dialogue, especially regarding fiscal 
adjustment, led to the breakdown of negotiations on labour market reform in June 2010, 
when the executive decided to adopt measures unilaterally. 
Social dialogue was nevertheless resumed later that year and a tripartite social pact (the only 
one concluded during the crisis) on employment and pensions was signed in January 2011. 
This change in attitude which allowed the conclusion of the agreement can be explained by 
several reasons: the change in the presidency of employers’ organization; 9 the appointment 
of a new Minister of Labour with a strong commitment to social dialogue; and a broader 
bargaining agenda with more issues on the table, thereby opening up new possibilities for 
 
4 See full text at: http://www.ugt.es/dialogosocial/declaraciondsocial.pdf 
5 See: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/1A22106D-D247-4274-AF8B-
9A7390000230/90303/DeclaraciondialogoSocial.pdf 
6 See full text at: 
http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc14633_Propuestas_sindicales_para_un_acuerdo_por_el
_empleo_y_la_proteccion_social.pdf 
7 See full text at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2009/10/26/pdfs/BOE-A-2009-16986.pdf 
8 See Parliamentary Debates, No. 225, Comisión de Trabajo e Inmigración, 10 March 2009, pp. 22-26. 
9  The involvement of the President of the CEOE, Díaz Ferrán, in investigations into the bankruptcy 
of some of his companies eroded his legitimacy, not only within CEOE, but also with the trade unions 
and the Government. As a result, negotiations became increasingly difficult as his position in the 
CEOE weakened. 
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mutual gains in the negotiations, and making it easier to reach compromises with the social 
partners.  
In contrast, no agreement could be reached a few months later on the reform of collective 
bargaining. Bipartite negotiations had evolved on the basis of some of the clauses in the 
January 2011 social pact, but no new tripartite agreement was finally possible. The 
Government again took unilateral action. However, bipartite social dialogue remained alive 
and delivered a new and important inter-confederal agreement in January 2012. By signing 
this agreement in a difficult social and economic context, the employers and trade unions 
made their commitment to social dialogue clear, and also signaled its importance to the 
incoming right-wing executive. They thereby demonstrated their willingness and capacity to 
negotiate reforms autonomously, particularly in the field of the labour market and industrial 
relations. 
Despite the January 2012 bipartite agreement on employment and collective bargaining 
2012-14, tripartite social dialogue has been discontinued since 2011. The announcement in 
February 2012 of a labour market reform without engaging in a process of social dialogue 
with the social partners, together with the general strike organized in May 2012 and an 
acceleration of fiscal adjustment in view of the deterioration of Spain’s macro-economic 
prospects, have had a very negative effect on social dialogue. The trade unions demonstrated 
their refusal to engage in social dialogue with the current right-wing administration and 
instead declared that they will only agree to negotiate after a referendum has been called on 
the austerity policies.  10  
Social dialogue dynamic during the recovery  
During the three-year period between November 2011 and March 2014, tripartite social 
dialogue was completely absent. Only in March 2014 did the trade unions and employers’ 
organizations ask the Government to restore tripartite social dialogue, resulting in some 
meetings held at the highest political level. The trade unions considered it particularly 
important to negotiate three issues: fiscal reform, active labour market policies and 
unemployment protection. On 29 July 2014, as a result of these meetings, the social partners 
and the Government signed proposals for tripartite negotiations to strengthen economic 
growth and employment. 11  The trade unions considered this to be an important step towards 
the abandonment of the unilateral path taken by the Government since November 2011. 
Moreover, based on the terms set out in this document, an agreement was signed in 
December 2014 on an employment activation programme, 12  including an extension of the 
guaranteed income for the long-term unemployed and the strengthening of activation 
measures for this category. Nevertheless, a few months later, it was impossible to reach 
agreement on the reform of the lifelong learning system which had up until then been 
managed by the trade unions and employers. The Government adopted the law reforming 
the vocational training and lifelong learning systems in March 2015. 13  
  
 
10 See: http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/economia/1348047099.html 
11  Acuerdo de Propuestas para la Negociación Tripartita para Fortalecer el Crecimiento Económico 
y el Empleo. See: 
http://www.ugt.es/Documentos%20de%20apoyo/Acuerdo_Propuestas_negociacion_tripartita_fortal
ecer_crecimiento_economico_y_empleo_29072014.pdf. 
12 Programa Extraordinario de Activación para el Empleo, see: 
http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/destacados/HOME/activacionempleo/archivos/Acuerdo_PEAE.pdf 
13 See text at http://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2015-3031 
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The importance of social dialogue in achieving a more rapid and socially sustainable 
recovery has been emphasized recently by the employers’ organizations CEOE and the 
Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (CEPYME) in a document 
containing proposals to help the recovery. 14 In addition to identifying a number of policy 
areas in which appropriate reforms could foster growth, they emphasize the importance of 
restoring social dialogue in the recovery phase with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of 
the reforms.  
Analysis of the dynamics of social dialogue during the crisis, and particularly since 2014, 
therefore shows no significant departure from earlier practices and methods of tripartite and 
bipartite social dialogue. The mistrust between the trade unions and the Government 
following its adoption of a unilateral approach to the regulation of key labour market, 
industrial relations and social policy issues has made it very difficult to restore any form of 
permanent tripartite social dialogue. Tripartite social dialogue therefore remains occasional, 
voluntarist and based on the willingness of the administration to involve the social partners 
in discussions on the content of reforms, which has been the exception rather than the rule 
in Spain.  
This can be seen in the two sole occasions on which the Government has involved the social 
partners. However, the July 2014 proposal for social dialogue is only a declaration of intent 
to re-launch tripartite social dialogue, and is very much limited to specific labour market 
issues. No attempt was made to conclude a broad agreement when the economy and the 
labour market started to show signs of recovery. The different views and diagnosis of the 
economic situation by the Government and the employers, on the one hand, and the trade 
unions, on the other, is one of the reasons for the absence of tripartite social dialogue, as 
pointed out by the interviewees. The trade unions claim that it is not possible to talk of 
recovery or growth with an unemployment rate above 20 per cent, accompanied by high 
levels of temporary employment and working poor. They also consider that the only way to 
make the recovery socially sustainable and lasting is to reverse most of the reforms 
implemented in previous years, including the labour market reform and the changes to the 
industrial relations system. The other occasion for tripartite social dialogue was the 
December 2014 agreement on employment activation and protection of the long-term 
unemployed, which was the only tripartite agreement concluded during the four-year 
mandate of the centre-right Rajoy administration.  
In contrast with tripartite social dialogue, bipartite social dialogue between the trade unions 
and employers has maintained its vitality. In July 2015, the social partners concluded the 
third Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining 2015-2016-2017 (AENC III). 15 
Even though negotiations took longer than expected due to disagreement on wage 
increases, 16  the trade unions and employers reached consensus on guidelines for developing 
collective bargaining over the next three years. Bipartite social dialogue has therefore shown 
greater resilience than tripartite social dialogue, as indicated in earlier works (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2011; Molina and Miguélez, 2013).  
The interviews with the social partners and government officials confirm these conclusions. 
Apart from the breakdown of tripartite social dialogue, which is not new, as it also occurred 
during previous crises and under centre-right governments, no permanent change is 
 
14“15 Reformas para Consolidar la Recuperación” (15 reforms to consolidate recovery), see text at: 
http://www.ceoe.es/resources/image/15_reformas_consolidar_recuperacion_2015_10.pdf 
15  III Acuerdo para el Empleo y la Negociación Colectiva 2015-2016-2017. See: 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/06/20/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-6865.pdf 
16  In particular, while employers’ organizations were in favour of maintaining a policy of strong 
wage moderation, the trade unions argued that it was time to boost demand through higher pay 
increases. 
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perceived. Moreover, the trade unions interviewed consider that a change in the political 
leaning of the government in the December 2015 elections could contribute to relaunching 
tripartite social dialogue. The interviews with both employers’ organizations and trade 
unions also confirmed their strong commitment to the governance of collective bargaining 
through peak bipartite agreements. 
1.4 Policies implemented in response to the crisis 
and in the post-crisis years 
Since the onset of the crisis in 2008, both the centre-left Zapatero administration (2007-
2011) and the right-wing Rajoy government (2011-2015) have implemented a large number 
of policy measures. Setting aside the differences in the orientation and content of the two 
administrations, there are three common traits to the reforms implemented over this period.  
 First, the number of reforms negotiated with the social partners has fallen considerably 
in comparison with previous crisis periods. This decline became particularly intense from 
2011 onwards, coinciding with the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis and the 
implementation of austerity packages.  
 Second, the decline in social dialogue reflects the lack of a common diagnosis of the 
problems affecting the Spanish economy and labour market, and the respective solutions. 
This has happened not only during the early years of the economic crisis, but also during 
the recovery period. Disagreement persists between the social partners and political 
parties on whether there is indeed a recovery and how to speed it up.  
 Third, all the economic measures implemented have been short-term and reactive in 
nature, or in other words have been adopted under the pressure of international financial 
markets and supranational institutions to address some of the imbalances of the economy. 
As a consequence, little has been done, particularly since 2014, when the economy 
showed the first indications of an upturn, to implement far-reaching structural reforms 
designed to establish the basis for a balanced economic recovery. This is particularly 
important taking into account the impact of the housing bubble on the Spanish economy 
and the need to build the foundation for a more sustainable growth path. The only 
exception was the Act No. 2/2011 on a sustainable economy, adopted in March 2011. 
The Act was preceded by talks with the social partners, political parties and other 
economic and civil actors. It contained an ambitious plan to achieve a more sustainable 
growth path through changes in the regulation of product and factor markets, the 
education system, competition law, etc. The final aim of the Act was to gradually move 
from an extensive growth model based on the expansion of employment to a more 
sustainable intensive model based on high value added activities and productivity 
increases (DGAMEI, 2011). However, in practice, the lack of resources has severely 
limited the impact of this project and has resulted in many of the measures set out in the 
Act being abandoned (Morán Criado, 2010). No attempt was made when the first signs 
of recovery started to appear to establish the basis for a new growth regime, or at least to 
put in place mechanisms to alleviate some of the social consequences of austerity 
policies, including the remarkable increase in income inequality. 
Without exception, all the fiscal consolidation packages since 2010 have been adopted and 
implemented without consultation with the social partners. Indeed, the role of the social 
partners in policy making has been restricted to negotiation on certain labour market and 
social policy issues, with no involvement in economic policy. In the context of growing 
uncertainty about Greece’s capacity to meet its borrowing requirements in early 2010, the 
Spanish Government announced the Plan for Immediate Action, 2010, and the Austerity 
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Plan, 2011-2013. 17  The executive was aware that the public investment effort made in 
previous months, together with high and increasing unemployment, was exerting strong 
pressure on public finances and required some measures for gradual stabilization. The Plan 
for Immediate Action, 2010, implied a further deficit reduction of 0.5 per cent of GDP in 
addition to the measures already set out in the Budget Act, as well as a ban on new public 
sector contracts. The Austerity Plan, 2011-2013, envisaged spending cuts in addition to those 
in the Budget Act in all areas except pensions, unemployment protection, R&D and 
education. It also included cuts in public sector wages (5 per cent in 2010) and a wage freeze 
for 2011, a freeze on pensions for 2011, a significant reduction in investment in housing and 
the abolition of the so-called ‘chèque bebé’. 
This first austerity package in May 2010 was adopted without any consultation or 
negotiation with the social partners. Indeed, it was announced by the Prime Minister in the 
middle of negotiations for a reform of collective bargaining. It therefore had a negative 
impact on social dialogue. A general strike was called in the public sector on June 2010 and 
negotiations on the reform of collective bargaining and the labour market broke down some 
weeks later. The trade unions criticized the plan very bitterly, together with the fact that they 
were not given any prior notice. The date of 12 May marked the beginning of a new period 
of social dialogue, characterized by increased tension and growing difficulties for tripartite 
social dialogue.  
The economic policy followed by the right-wing administration elected in November 2011 
has been characterized by a strong commitment to austerity, continuing the policy direction 
initiated some months earlier. This took the form of the adoption of a more negative 
approach to tripartite social dialogue. None of the fiscal consolidation packages adopted 
since 2011 have been negotiated with the social partners. The first package was adopted in 
December 2011, 18 and the second in March 2012. 19  The same applies to budget laws 
implementing the austerity policies between 2012 and 2014. 
1.5 Explaining the abandonment of tripartite policy making 
The actors involved give very different explanations for the abandonment of tripartite social 
dialogue during the crisis. One of the arguments put forward by employers and PSOE and 
PP executives is the inability of social dialogue to keep pace with real economic 
developments and to be able to provide quick and meaningful responses. This explanation 
was also advanced by other parties during the early months of the crisis. 20  
Another recurrent argument is the low level of effectiveness of measures negotiated through 
social dialogue. 21 This argument was also used by some of those interviewed, referring to 
the fact that, although the unions and employers had signed several agreements between the 
mid-1990s and 2008 on the labour market and collective bargaining, in some cases they had 
had very little effect. The argument put forward was that, by their very nature, negotiated 
 
17  See full text at: 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referencias/_2010/refc20100129.htm 
18  Real Decreto-ley 20/2011, de 30 de diciembre, de medidas urgentes en materia presupuestaria, 
tributaria y financiera para la corrección del déficit público (BOE 31/12/2011) 
19  Real Decreto-ley 12/2012, de 30 de marzo, por el que se introducen diversas medidas tributarias 
y administrativas dirigidas a la reducción del déficit público (BOE 31/03/2012) 
20  Parliamentary Debates No. 59, Comisión Trabajo e Inmigración, Sesión Extraordinaria 22 July 
2008, p. 35. 
21  Parliamentary Debates No. 128, Comisión Trabajo e Inmigración, Sesión 30 October 2008, p. 14. 
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reforms reflect the equilibrium between the positions of the actors involved, and are 
accordingly less effective. The limited room for manoeuvre of the executive due to fiscal 
policy constraints has also hindered the possibility to conclude tripartite agreements. This is 
because the political exchanges required to reach tripartite agreement are less likely when 
there are no resources available to compensate the ‘sacrifices’ made by the other actors. 
Something similar happened in the early 1990s in the context of the economic crisis and the 
adjustment to the Maastricht criteria on inflation and the budget deficit, when tripartite social 
dialogue also failed to deliver any agreement. A related argument is that there is a misfit 
between macroeconomic governance at the EU level and national governance.  
Last but not least, the legitimacy of tripartite social dialogue has also emerged as a 
particularly important consideration in explaining its abandonment. From the viewpoint of 
legitimacy, the criticisms made by some sectors of the population concerning the trade 
unions and employers in the context of the crisis and austerity policies have certainly reduced 
the incentive for the executive to rely on this form of governance. For example, in the case 
of the recent labour market reform, the party in office expressed the view that real legitimacy 
lies with Parliament and that there is therefore no obligation or need to validate agreements 
through social dialogue. 22 When the supranational dimension is added, or in other words, 
the mandate from the EU to undertake fiscal adjustment, it is commonly considered that 
executives are more accountable for economic policies to supranational actors than to 
citizens or the social partners. Finally, the failure of tripartite social dialogue to deliver 
agreements in the early stages of the crisis also had a negative effect on how it was perceived, 
by supporting the view that the social partners shared some responsibility for the way in 
which the crisis was managed. 
1.6 Strategies of the social partners and the Government 
to mitigate the crisis  
The strategies and policies implemented to mitigate the effects of the crisis on employment 
have implied changes in several fields, including the regulation of hiring and firing, 
collective dismissals, training, active labour market policies, collective bargaining and wage 
setting. The role of social dialogue (either tripartite or bipartite) in these areas has varied 
markedly, playing almost no role in the regulation of hiring and firing and active labour 
market policies, and retaining a more important role in wage setting and collective 
bargaining: 
 In the case of the regulation of hiring and firing, there was no involvement of the social 
partners in any of the three important reforms adopted during the crisis. 
 The regulation of collective dismissals was also adopted without consensus with trade 
unions and employers’ organizations. 
 The trade unions and employers have tried to mitigate the effects of the crisis on 
employment by enforcing a policy of wage moderation since 2010 through the 
negotiation of peak inter-confederal agreements. With the recovery in job creation 
observed in 2014, the trade unions have pushed for higher wage increases as a way of 
increasing demand and employment. However, the employers have insisted on the need 
to maintain a tight wage moderation policy in order to help the recovery of the economy 
and the labour market. 
 Active labour market policies have also been reformed, without the involvement of the 
social partners. 
 
22  See Parliamentary Debates No. 24, Plenary Session, 11 April 2012, p. 5. 
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The main strategy followed by the Government to mitigate the employment effects of the 
crisis has been to introduce greater flexibility, with an emphasis on certain aspects: 
a. External flexibility is the dimension that has seen the most changes during the crisis. 
In particular, conditions for firing employees, either on an individual or collective 
basis, were relaxed in all three of the major reforms adopted during the period (2010, 
2011 and 2012). The February 2012 reform was particularly important in this regard 
in introducing a new type of contract (the so-called stable contract to support 
entrepreneurship) under which there are no redundancy costs during the first year. 
b. Internal numerical flexibility: some attempts were made in 2010 and 2011 to extend 
short-time working schemes. In particular, the main goal of Act No. 35/2010 was to 
increase the possibility for companies to rely on negotiated adjustment through 
functional/internal flexibility, without necessarily resorting to quantitative external 
adjustment. The reform enhanced the capacity of company collective agreements to 
introduce internal flexibility mechanisms, while at the same time opening more 
opportunities to opt out of higher level agreements on wages and other working 
conditions. The extension of short-time working scheme clauses was introduced as 
a means of maintaining employment. These clauses, which had only been used to a 
limited extent by Spanish companies, increased in number during the crisis, 
although the reform does not appear to have had a significant impact and its 
extension and use has followed a pattern similar to those of other crisis periods (see 
Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Number of workers affected by short-time working schemes, 1982-2013  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
             Source: Boletin de Estadísticas Laborales, Ministry of Labour and Emigration 
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c. Wage flexibility. Changes in the collective bargaining structure have significantly 
enhanced wage flexibility in two ways. First, by opening greater spaces for company 
collective agreements to opt out of sectoral agreements, as in the 2011 and 2012 
reforms. Second, by allowing employers not to apply the terms of the collective 
agreement and to modify the wage conditions of their employees (the 2012 reform). 
1.7 Involvement of the social partners in the formulation and implementation 
of National Reform Programmes 
Analysis of the interviews with the social partners, government officials and European 
Semester Officers shows that the formulation and implementation of economic policies in 
the context of National Reform Programmes (NRP) has not offered an opportunity for the 
revitalization of social dialogue, either during the debt crisis or the recovery period.  
There is no formalized mechanism or pre-established process for the negotiation of draft 
NRPs with the social partners. Their involvement therefore very much depends on the 
willingness of the Government to engage them in the process. Even though the European 
Semester Officers interviewed acknowledge that, in view of the current social dialogue 
climate in Spain, this has led to mere formal consultation of the social partners, they consider 
that their involvement is a national matter in which they cannot interfere. In so doing, they 
refer to the subsidiarity principle with regard to national social dialogue. As a general 
principle, European Semester Officers would welcome greater involvement by the social 
partners in the preparation and implementation of NRPs. However, they add that the process 
is very bureaucratic in practice, often consisting of tiny amendments to previous NRPs. They 
therefore consider that the low level of involvement of the social partners in the drafting of 
NRPs is not particularly worrying. Moreover, in view of the strict schedule imposed by the 
European Commission for the delivery of NRPs, it is very often difficult to involve the social 
partners properly in their discussion. 
The official discourse, emphasizing the importance of social dialogue and the involvement 
of the social partners, therefore contrasts with the reality of European Commission 
recommendations for NRPs, their review and the preparation of national documents. 
Analysis of these texts reveals that no reference was made to social dialogue in the 2011, 
2012 and 2014 processes in either the documents of the European Commission or the NRPs. 
Moreover, over this same period, the NRPs did not contain any reference to the views of 
trade unions or employers’ organizations. More importantly, the review by the European 
Commission of NRPs and progress in their implementation did not contain any reference to 
the need to strengthen social dialogue. Only in the 2014 NRP is there an Annex containing 
the comments of trade unions and employers’ organizations. The 2014 NRP also highlights 
the importance of involving the Third Social Sector in the process. Similarly, the 2015 NRP 
includes the recommendations of the social partners and refers to the tripartite agreement 
concluded in July 2014, covering a number of issues that the social partners and the 
Government consider it important to negotiate through tripartite social dialogue. 
The trade unions judge their involvement in NRPs to be clearly insufficient and criticize the 
Government for not taking into consideration or incorporating any of their 
recommendations. They say that it is not enough to attach an annex containing their views, 
if the Government does not discuss and take on at least some of them in its policies. They 
are particularly critical of the tight schedule imposed for the discussion of NRPs, which 
prevents their proper discussion and the consideration of amendments.  
One of the points repeatedly emphasized by the trade unions concerning NRPs is the need 
to create a guaranteed minimum income due to the high unemployment rate and the falling 
coverage of unemployment benefits. As a reaction to this lack of involvement and 
consideration of trade union proposals, the two major trade union confederations have 
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initiated a Popular Legislative Initiative, consisting of the collection of signatures calling on 
Parliament to discuss a proposal for a universal guaranteed income. 23  As confirmed by the 
interviews with trade union officials, this should be interpreted as the adoption of proactive 
approach using channels other than social dialogue. 
The European Semester Officers consider that existing institutions of social dialogue in 
Spain are adequate. In particular, they note that they regularly interact with the Economic 
and Social Council and hold meetings with representatives from all three groups. They are 
aware that non-institutionalized social dialogue is dependent on the economic and political 
situation, and therefore believe that it is important to maintain an institutional channel of 
communication with the social partners.  
One aspect mentioned in both the 2014 and 2015 NRPs is the need to involve the Third 
Social Sector in the Economic and Social Council. The Council is currently composed of 
trade unions, employers’ organizations and a third group consisting of consumer 
associations, as well as agriculture, fishery and mining associations. However, the Third 
Social Sector is playing an increasingly important role in the formulation and 
implementation of NRPs, particularly in terms of combating social exclusion. The 
Government recognizes this and considers that the Third Social Sector will make a key 
contribution to achieving the social targets of the EU2020 strategy, and particularly those 
relating to poverty and social exclusion. Both the Government and the European Semester 
Officers assess positively the inclusion of the Third Social Sector in the preparation of NRPs. 
Their institutionalized involvement in the Economic and Social Council has also been called 
for recently by the Third Sector Platform  24  
1.8 Social dialogue in labour law and pension reform 
The crisis in Spain has resulted in a large number of changes in labour market regulation 
(Pastor, 2015). Common to all these has been the introduction of greater labour market 
flexibility. According to the OECD, these changes have resulted in a reduction of labour 
market rigidities, as measured by the Employment Protection Legislation Index (OECD, 
2014). However, as clearly shown in Table 2, tripartite social dialogue on labour market 
reform was not significant during the economic crisis. The general rule was the exclusion, 
rather than the involvement, of the social partners. Moreover, in cases where there were 
tripartite negotiations, it was difficult to reach agreement. With the recovery of the economy 
and the labour market, there are some signs of revitalization of social dialogue on labour 
market reform, although largely on issues that are marginal relative to those regulated 
unilaterally by the Government in previous years.  
  
 
23  See http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/04/21/actualidad/1429629576_421037.html 
24 The Third Sector Platform is an umbrella organization comprising very different actors, including 
charities, voluntary associations, such as the Red Cross, organizations of the disabled, etc. For more 
information, see: http://www.plataformatercersector.es 
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Table 2: Labour market reforms and social dialogue in Spain, 2008-2015 
 Reform Social dialogue dynamic 
September 2010 Urgent measures to reform the labour 
market  
Tripartite negotiations failed and the Government took 
unilateral action 
June 2011 Urgent measures to reform collective 
bargaining 
Tripartite negotiations failed and the Government took 
unilateral action  
February 2012 Urgent measures to reform the labour 
market 
The Government took unilateral action, with no tripartite 
social dialogue or consultations with the social partners 
January 2013 Extension of the programme for the 
reskilling of the long-term unemployed 
without unemployment protection (Prepara 
Plan) 
No social dialogue or consultation of the social partners 
December 2013 Mechanisms to enhance employment 
stability and employability  
No social dialogue or consultation of the social partners 
February 2014 Urgent measures to boost employment and 
open-ended contracts 
No social dialogue or consultation of the social partners 
February 2014 Protection of part-time workers and other 
socio-economic policies 
No social dialogue or consultation of the social partners 
September 2014 Employment incentives and activation  No social dialogue or consultation of the social partners 
December 2014 Extraordinary programme for employment 
activation 
Tripartite negotiations delivered an agreement with the 
Government 
March 2015 Urgent reform of the vocational training 
system 
Tripartite negotiations did not deliver an agreement 
between the social partners and the Government 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration 
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Table 3: Pension reforms and social dialogue in Spain, 2008-2015 
 Reform Social Dialogue Dynamics 
January 2011 Social and economic agreement on pensions, 
labour market and collective bargaining 
Tripartite social dialogue with the trade unions and 
employers’ organizations delivers an agreement 
March 2013 Act promoting active ageing and continuity of 
working life 
The social partners were involved in the negotiations, but 
criticized the very short period available and an agreement 
could not be signed 
December 2013 Act changing the sustainability factor and 
revaluation index of pensions  
Tripartite social dialogue was replaced by technocratic 
decision-making by an expert committee including 
representatives appointed by employers and the two main 
trade unions 
 
Source: authors’ own elaboration  
There have been two main pension reforms since 2008. The first was the 2011 Economic 
and Social Agreement for Growth, Employment and the Sustainability of Pensions (Royal 
Legislative Decree No. 1/2011). 25 Following the general strike in September 2010, and 
repeated failure to reach a tripartite agreement, both the trade unions and employers’ 
organizations considered it urgent to restore social dialogue and deliver agreements. They 
realized that, after three years of recession and no broad consensus on how to exit the crisis, 
the population was questioning their role. As one trade union official pointed out, “if social 
dialogue does not deliver agreements, it will be weakened”. There was therefore great 
pressure to conclude an agreement, although the context was not particularly favourable. 
The trade unions were very much in favour of a comprehensive agreement covering the 
labour market, collective bargaining and old-age pensions. The executive also supported 
this, following the deterioration in relations with the trade unions as a result of the labour 
market reforms and the September 2010 general strike.  
A comprehensive tripartite social pact was finally signed in February 2011 including 
commitments on issues such as old-age pensions, youth unemployment, active labour market 
policies, the reform of collective bargaining and R&D. The most controversial aspect of the 
agreement was the reform of old-age pensions. It envisaged a gradual increase in the 
pensionable age from 65 to 67 years, with the possibility of receiving a pension at the age of 
65 following 38 years of contributions. The reform was bitterly contested by large factions 
within the trade unions. The most critical voices were those of young people, who consider 
it very difficult to contribute a sufficient number of years to their pension due to high rates 
of temporary employment and frequent spells of unemployment. 
The Rajoy administration introduced two main changes in the pension system. First, in 
March 2013, it adopted a Decree making early retirement more difficult, modifying the 
conditions for access to partial retirement and promoting active ageing. 26  Even though the 
Government involved the social partners in negotiating the reform, no agreement could be 
reached and it finally adopted the reform unilaterally. The reform increased requirements for 
 
25  Acuerdo Social y Económico para el Crecimiento, el Empleo y la Sostenibilidad de las Pensiones. 
See full text at: http://www.ugt.es/actualidad/2011/febrero/acuerdo_social_y_economico.pdf 
26  Ley 5/2013 de medidas para favorecer la continuidad de la vida laboral de los trabajadores de 
mayor edad y promover el envejecimiento activo, see text at 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/03/16/pdfs/BOE-A-2013-2874.pdf 
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access to voluntary or involuntary early retirement (the minimum contribution period for a 
full pension, the minimum retirement age, etc.), as well as for partial retirement.  
The second main reform was in December 2013, 27  when the Government set up an expert 
group, including university professors, trade union officials, employers and practitioners, to 
formulate a proposal to reform two aspects of the old-age pension system: the so-called 
revaluation index, which consists of the application of a formula every year updating pension 
amounts taking into consideration aspects such as the total expected expenditure on pensions 
and inflation; and the so-called sustainability factor, which is an automatic instrument for 
the adjustment of pension levels to the life expectancy of pensioners. This reform was 
preceded, not by social dialogue, but by a more technocratic mechanism, based on the report 
prepared by the expert committee. However, the representatives of the two main union 
confederations, the UGT and CCOO, expressed different views on the committee’s 
proposals. The CCOO was positive about the content of proposals, and only criticized the 
fact that the implementation of the reform would be delayed until 2019. In contrast, the UGT 
criticized both the content and the timing proposed by the committee.  
 
27 Ley 23/2013 reguladora del Factor de Sostenibilidad y del Índice de Revalorización del Sistema 
de Pensiones de la Seguridad Social, see text at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2013/12/26/pdfs/BOE-A-
2013-13617.pdf 
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Section II. The role and impact of National Social Dialogue 
Institutions (NSDI) 
2.1 Overview and role of NSDI 
The Economic and Social Council is a tripartite institution established in 1991 to promote 
understanding between the social and economic partners. Even though the 1978 Constitution 
(Article 131.2) already contained the mandate for a tripartite consultative body, it took 
almost 15 years for it to be established. It is composed of employees' organizations, trade 
unions and other representatives of sectoral interests. The Economic and Social Council is a 
government advisory body on socio-economic and employment issues, which means that its 
voice is heard in decisions affecting the various sectors of Spanish society. It is governed by 
public law and has legal personality, full legal capacity and organizational and functional 
autonomy in carrying out its mission, and is attached to the Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration.  28  
The Economic and Social Council has two main functions. First, it issues opinions on a 
mandatory basis on draft bills, draft royal legislative decrees regulating socio-economic and 
labour policy, and draft royal decrees considered by the Government to be of particular 
significance in this field. Second, the Economic and Social Council also examines and 
analyses social issues at its own initiative. Its annual report on the national socio-economic 
and employment situation has become an essential reference point for understanding the 
situation in Spain. This latter function has become more important in the context of the 
economic crisis as a way of revitalizing the role of the Council.  
The Economic and Social Council consists of 61 members, appointed by the Government, 
including: 
a. The President. 
b. Twenty members, making up the First Group, designated by the most representative 
trade unions, in proportion to their membership. 
c. Twenty members, making up the Second Group, designated by the most 
representative employers' organizations, in proportion to their membership. 
d. Twenty members, making up the Third Group, as follows: 
- Fourteen are proposed by the following organizations and associations: 
 Three by professional farming associations. 
 Three by the fishers’ organizations. 
 Four by the Consumers and Users Council. 
 Four by associations of cooperatives and worker-owned companies, on 
behalf of the social economy. 
 
28  For more information, see: http://www.ces.es/en/web/guest/naturaleza 
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-  Six experts appointed by the central Government and proposed jointly by the 
Labour and Social Affairs and Finance and Treasury Ministers, after consultation 
with the organizations represented on the Council. 
The Council members fulfil their functions in full autonomy and independence. All 
members, including the President, have a four-year mandate, renewable for four-year 
periods.  
The Plenary of the Council (or, where applicable, the Standing Committee when the Council 
delegates functions to it) issues opinions on matters referred for consultation by the 
Government. Each Council opinion is documented separately, with sections covering 
background, the Council's assessment and its conclusions, and is signed by the Secretary-
General and endorsed by the President, with any dissenting opinions attached. The Council's 
opinions are not binding on the Government. 
The Plenary of the Council, or the Standing Committee, also issues studies and reports on 
matters related to its mandate at the request of the Government or of Council members, or 
at its own initiative. The decision to prepare a report at its own initiative is taken by the 
Plenary of the Council, through the Standing Committee, at the request of the President, the 
Standing Committee, one member group or eight Council members. 
Table 4: Procedure for drawing up an opinion or report 
Opinion or report Own-initiative report 
Request to the Council by the national 
Government or government ministers for an 
opinion or report Agreement by the Plenary to prepare the report 
Referral to the working committee responsible in the field 
Preparation of a proposed text by the working committee 
Presentation of the proposed opinion or report to the Plenary of the Council, together with any amendments 
Approval of the opinion or report by the Plenary of the Council 
Submission of the opinion or report, together 
with any dissenting opinions, to the requesting 
body Dissemination of the report 
Source: http://www.ces.es/en/web/guest/funcionamiento 
2.2 Involvement of the NSDIs in policy formulation 
The Economic and Social Council plays a very limited and indirect role in fostering non-
institutionalized social dialogue, as well as in the negotiation of tripartite agreements or 
social pacts. Due to its advisory role, its involvement has been restricted to issuing opinions 
on draft legislation proposed by the executive.  
However, in recent years, the Council has been adopting a more proactive approach by 
issuing more reports and opinions at its own initiative. The aim is precisely to influence the 
Government and relevant actors on the need to regulate certain issues, and how this should 
be done. In this respect, it may be argued that the passive involvement of the Economic and 
Social Council in formulating policy responses, which was aggravated during the crisis, is 
changing towards a more proactive approach.  
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2.3 Impact of the crisis on NSDI 
The interviews revealed a common perception of the significant and dual impact of the crisis 
on the Economic and Social Council.  
First, as with tripartite social dialogue, the Economic and Social Council has also been under 
attack.  Indeed, Economic and Social Councils have been abolished as part of austerity 
packages in several Autonomous Communities, including, up to now, in Madrid, La Rioja, 
the Balearic Islands, Castilla La Mancha, Cantabria, Asturias and, more recently, Valencia. 
In all cases, the justification given was the low impact of the Council on policy. This has 
also occurred in the context of the public administration reforms initiated by the Government 
in October 2014, which are aimed at rationalizing the public sector, including the 
suppression of institutions whose functions are duplicated at the national and regional levels. 
Economic and Social Councils are one of the targets of this reform, as it is considered 
unnecessary to have both national and regional structures. As a result, in many Autonomous 
Communities with a PP government, there has been a movement to suppress Economic and 
Social Councils. The trade unions and employers’ organizations, together with left-wing 
parties, including the PSOE and the United Left, have strongly opposed their suppression.  
Second, discussions in the Economic and Social Council have been affected by the frequent 
use (and abuse) of urgent procedures for the adoption of laws. Under the Spanish 
Constitution (Article 86), the use of urgent procedures to draft and adopt legislation by the 
executive should be restricted to cases of the “utmost and extraordinary urgency and social 
need”. Under such conditions, the Government may adopt legislation in the form of 
Legislative Decrees. The difficult financial and economic situation during the period 2010 
to 2014 often led the Government to legislate using Royal Legislative Decrees, which require 
less discussion in Parliament, and for which the opinion of the Economic and Social Council 
is not required. 
In 2014 and 2015, the Economic and Social Council repeatedly denounced the lack of time 
available to issue its recommendations and opinions on particularly important issues. The 
trade unions share this view and consider that over-reliance on Royal Legislative Decrees is 
poor democratic practice. However, this situation started before the debt crisis and the 
austerity policies beginning in May 2010. For example, the Plenary of the Economic and 
Social Council adopted a joint position in 2009 calling on the Government to send it draft 
laws for review and opinion. 29  
Notwithstanding the challenges resulting from the crisis concerning the role and public 
perception of the Council, some of its opinions have had a significant impact. For example, 
in the case of the opinion on the proposal to reform the pension system issued in September 
201330, all three actors in the Council unanimously condemned the attempt by the 
Government to end the adjustment of pensions to inflation. This opinion had a strong public 
impact because of the opposition by employers’ organizations to the proposal by the centre-
right Government. Other opinions issued by the Council have also had a significant impact, 
 
29  See El País, 4 November 2009, “El CES recuerda al Gobierno que le debe enviar leyes” 
(http://elpais.com/diario/2009/11/04/espana/1257289207_850215.html) 
30  Opinion No. 7, 2013, approved in the plenary session on 26 September 2013, ‘Sobre el 
Anteproyecto de Ley reguladora del Factor de sostenibilidad y del índice de revalorización del 
sistema de pensiones de la Seguridad Social’ 
(http://www.ces.es/documents/10180/631510/Dic072013.pdf) 
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such as opinion No. 6 of June 2013 on the proposal for a law to support entrepreneurship31. 
Once again, there was consensus among the members of the Council on many problematic 
aspects of the proposed legislation, including its ambiguous character and the lack of specific 
measures for the achievement of the stated goals.  32  
Interviews with members of the Council also showed that, in reaction to its marginalization, 
there have been attempts to revitalize its role. The most important has been the adoption of 
a more proactive stance and the initiatives taken to prepare reports in important socio-
economic issues at its own initiative. This is seen as a way of overcoming the passive and 
reactive nature of its main statutory function, that is issuing opinions on a mandatory basis 
on draft legislation, draft Royal Legislative Decrees regulating socio-economic and labour 
policy, and draft Royal Decrees considered by the Government to be of particular 
significance in this field. 
There are no official initiatives to strengthen institutional support for social dialogue, or to 
modify its role. The only aspect that has emerged recently as a means of enhancing its 
legitimacy and representativeness is the incorporation of the Third Social Sector in its 
activities, as called for by the Third Sector Platform, which was consulted during the drafting 
of the 2014 and 2015 NRPs. However, there is currently no official initiative for the inclusion 
of this group in the Council. There appears to be consensus on the need to maintain the clear 
differentiation between formal/institutionalized channels of social dialogue (the national and 
regional Economic and Social Councils) and the non-formalized channels of bipartite and 
tripartite social dialogue.  
 
 
31  Opinion No. 6, 2013, approved in the plenary session on 1 June 2013, ‘Sobre el Anteproyecto de 
Ley de Apoyo a los emprendedores y su internacionalización’ 
(http://www.ces.es/documents/10180/631510/Dic062013.pdf) 
32  See El País, 11 June 2013, “Los 12 reveses a la Ley de Emprendedores”. 
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Section III. Collective bargaining during the crisis and post-crisis 
periods 
3.1 Impact of the crisis on collective bargaining 
The reform of collective bargaining has been one of the most widely debated issues since 
the beginning of the crisis. The main problems perceived are related, first, to the excessive 
rigidity that it imposes on wage setting. On the one hand, it is argued that the existing 
structure of collective bargaining: (a) delivered high wage increases, due to its intermediate 
level of (de-)centralization; and (b) limited possibilities for the flexible adjustment of wages 
to new contexts. It is also argued by some political parties and employers that the extension 
of the terms of an agreement once negotiations on its renewal have failed (so-called 
ultraactividad) imposes excessive rigidities that are particularly harmful in times of crisis. 
When assessing the impact of the crisis on collective bargaining, it is important to bear in 
mind the diverging trends of legal reforms and the bipartite agreements on employment and 
collective bargaining concluded between the trade unions and employers. As seen in Table 
5, the unilateral nature of the legal reforms introduced is in contrast with the consensus and 
stability demonstrated by peak bipartite social dialogue, as reflected in the three agreements 
on employment and collective bargaining concluded between 2008 and 2015.  
Unilaterally imposed legislative changes in collective bargaining are not only likely to 
arouse opposition and resistance by the social partners, but it is more probable that they will 
fail to deliver the expected outcomes due to implementation problems. The gap that has been 
opened between State-imposed legal regulation of industrial relations and collective 
bargaining, and its governance by the social partners, constitutes a major problem for 
industrial relations in Spain. In contrast, the continuity and resilience exhibited by bipartite 
social dialogue and collective bargaining has to be welcomed as a way of enhancing the 
governance capacity of collective bargaining, and more generally of coordinating industrial 
relations. 
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Table 5: Legislative changes in collective bargaining and bipartite social dialogue   
Legislative changes in collective bargaining Bipartite agreements on employment and collective 
bargaining 
  February 2010 – Ist Inter-
Confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective 
Bargaining, 2010-2011-2012 
(AENC I) 
Bipartite agreement 
between trade unions 
and employers’ 
organizations 
2011 – Urgent 
measures to reform 
collective 
Negotiations failed - no 
tripartite agreement 
signed 
  
  January 2012 – IInd Inter-
Confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective 
Bargaining, 2012-2013-2014 
(AENC II) 
Bipartite agreement 
between trade unions 
and employers’ 
organizations 
February 2012 – 
Urgent measures to 
reform collective 
bargaining 
Without negotiations - 
imposed unilaterally 
  
  May 2013 – Agreement of 
the Steering Committee of 
AENC II on the extension of 
collective agreements upon  
expiry (ultraactividad) 
Bipartite agreement 
between trade unions 
and employers’ 
organizations 
  July 2015 - IIIrd Inter-
Confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective 
Bargaining, 2012-2013-2014 
(AENC III) 
Bipartite agreement 
between trade unions 
and employers’ 
organizations 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
The trend towards the decentralization of collective bargaining has accelerated during the 
crisis. However, this trend has not had a quantitative impact in terms of an increase in 
collective bargaining at the company level (see Figure 10 below), but rather a qualitative 
increase in the regulatory capacity of lower-level agreements over sectoral agreements 
(Molina, 2014). Before the 2012 reform, all collective bargaining reforms included 
mechanisms for organized decentralization, with higher-level collective agreements 
establishing the criteria for lower-level agreements (Martín and Alós, 2003). The multi-level 
bargaining system, in which sectoral collective agreements supervise the process of 
decentralization, was a strategy shared by trade unions and employers’ organizations, as 
confirmed by the 1997 peak inter-confederal agreement on collective bargaining and all 
subsequent peak agreements. However, the 2012 reform constituted a breakdown in this 
respect, as it not only enhanced the regulatory capacity of company agreements (by 
extending opt out possibilities), but also gave more power to employers, while reducing the 
regulatory capacity of sectoral agreements. Procedural changes were also introduced in the 
regulation of collective bargaining to facilitate and speed up the renewal of existing 
agreements, including changes in collective dispute resolution mechanisms. Even though the 
social partners have defended their autonomy to reform collective bargaining, the executive 
has introduced most of the changes without negotiation.  
In this regard, it is also important to note the differences between industrial relations in the 
private and public sectors. The main impact of fiscal consolidation on collective bargaining 
has been in the public sector (Molina, forthcoming). As a result of financial pressure, Spanish 
governments adopted austerity measures between 2010 and 2015 to reduce the public deficit. 
These packages were imposed unilaterally on the social partners and consisted of a series of 
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measures, including cuts in social spending and policies, cuts in public sector pay, limits on 
hiring and the replacement of retired workers, cuts in public investment, a freeze on pension 
benefits and increases in working time for public employees. Even though the intensity and 
types of measures adopted varied, one common feature of all austerity packages was the use 
of public sector pay and employment as an important adjustment mechanism. Indeed, 
adjustment in Spain has been based more on expenditure than revenue (Dellepiane and 
Hardiman, 2012). 
Inter-Confederal Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining, 
2010-2012 (AENC I) 
Due to its importance, bipartite social dialogue on the reform of collective bargaining has 
been continuing for a long time. However, the crisis has emphasized certain significant 
differences between unions and employers concerning the problems affecting collective 
bargaining and their solution. This became clear with the failure of negotiations to reach an 
agreement to renew the 2008 AENC containing guidelines on collective bargaining in 
2009. 33 In November that year, the trade unions and employers signed an agreement to 
unblock negotiation of several collective agreements. 34 Bi-partite social dialogue was 
resumed, and three months later the peak organizations concluded the 2010 bipartite inter-
confederal agreement on employment and collective bargaining for 2010-2012 (AENC I). 35 
This agreement, which continued the series of peak inter-confederal agreements initiated 
some years before, covered several issues, including the transformation of temporary 
contracts into open-ended contracts, internal flexibility, teleworking, wage guidelines, the 
use of opt-out clauses and the beginning of negotiations around the reform of collective 
bargaining rules. 
Further to the commitment expressed in the agreement, negotiations were continued with a 
view to agreeing on a reform of collective bargaining. However, the negotiations did not 
result in an agreement in 2010. The labour market reform unilaterally adopted by the 
Socialist administration in September 2010 (Act No. 35/2010) contained some minor 
implications for collective bargaining. More specifically, the reform enhanced the capacity 
of company collective agreements to introduce internal flexibility by favouring greater 
adaptability to economic circumstances, while allowing greater scope for the non-
application of wage agreements and other working conditions at the company level (Del 
Rey, 2010; García et al., 2010). Trade unions severely criticized the reform and called for a 
general strike. 36  
 
33  Since 2002, the trade unions and employers’ organizations in Spain have signed a peak inter-
confederal agreement at the beginning of each year establishing the objectives and guidelines for the 
development of negotiations at all levels of the collective bargaining structure. The only year when 
no agreement was concluded was 2009. 
34http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/sec_trabajo/ccncc/D_AspectosNormativos/Normativa/contenidos/Co
mpromiso2009.htm 
35http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc17657_Acuerdo_para_el_Empleo_y_la_Negociacion_
Colectiva_2010,_2011_y_2012..pdf  
36  The trade unions prepared a critical assessment of the reform. See: 
http://www2.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc25209_Valoracion_de_CCOO_y_UGT_de_la_Ley_de
_Medidas_Urgentes_Reforma_del_mercado_de_Trabajo.pdf 
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The 2011 reform of collective bargaining 
Following the September 2010 general strike against the labour market reform adopted by 
the Socialist Government, bipartite negotiations among the social partners resumed some 
months later in the context of the 2011 Social and Economic Tripartite Agreement. More 
specifically, the tripartite agreement included a document setting out the starting point for 
the negotiation of a reform of collective bargaining.  37 After four months of bipartite talks 
between unions and employers, consensus was only possible to a limited extent, and no 
agreement was therefore signed. The Government had urged the social partners to reach 
agreement, and decided to take unilateral action on this issue through the adoption in June 
2011of a Royal Legislative Decree on urgent measures to reform collective bargaining.  38 
Even though the content of the reform reflected the limited consensus reached between the 
trade unions and employers, the social partners were critical, as they considered it a violation 
of their collective autonomy. The reform introduced changes in the structure of collective 
bargaining by establishing a series of issues for priority negotiation at the company level. It 
also modified the procedures and timing for the denunciation and renegotiation of collective 
agreements with the aim of avoiding an escalation of disputes and speeding up the process 
(Escudero, 2011).  
The 2012 Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining (AENC II) 
Bipartite negotiations on the reform of collective bargaining resumed at the end of 2011. 
Some of the principles intended to orient the reform were contained in the AENC II, 39  which 
should be interpreted as a continuation of AENC I, although the signatories acknowledged 
the changes in the international context and their impact on economic growth and the labour 
market. Interestingly, the agreement starts by noting the loss of competitiveness of the 
Spanish economy due to high nominal wage increases. It then calls for an incomes policy 
agreement to help to bring wage trends into line with productivity and euro zone inflation, 
showing that the social partners were well aware of the problems facing the Spanish 
economy and agreed to make sacrifices. 
The underlying objective of the agreement was to bring changes in collective bargaining and 
the labour market back to the scope of autonomous negotiations between trade unions and 
employers’ organizations. The failure to reach agreement and the unilateral reform adopted 
by the Government in 2011 forced the social partners to agree on the direction in which 
collective bargaining should move with a view to preventing further attempts at unilateral 
intervention. 
The most important and innovative aspect of the AENC II, in comparison with the AENC I, 
is the explicit call for the decentralization of collective bargaining within the framework of 
sectoral agreements, which should establish the rules for the articulation of company 
agreements, while enhancing the role of the latter. Moreover, the agreement also requires 
collective agreements to include plans to develop internal flexibility through a clear 
distinction between three elements: wages, working time and functions. AENC II therefore 
constitutes another step in the attempt to enhance internal flexibility with a view to 
 
37  See full text at 
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201101/28/espana/20110128elpepunac_1_Pe
s_PDF.pdf 
38  http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/06/11/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-10131.pdf 
39http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc96566_Boletin_Oficial_del_Estado,_II_Acuerdo_para
_el_Empleo_y_la_Negociacion_Colectiva_2012,_2013_Y_2014..pdf 
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safeguarding jobs in the short term, but with the longer-term objective of changing the 
mechanisms for the adjustment of the labour market and moving from external (numerical) 
towards internal (functional) flexibility. It also takes into account the worsening economic 
situation by correcting some of the conditions agreed in AENC I, for example concerning 
negotiated wages.  
The 2012 labour market reform: Implications for collective bargaining 
Despite the success of the trade unions and employers in bringing the reform of collective 
bargaining back to the ambit of autonomous negotiations in AENC II, the executive adopted 
unilateral action once again a few weeks later without holding talks with the social partners. 
Moreover, all the significant innovations and guidelines for developing internal flexibility 
in collective bargaining included in AENC II were overlooked by the Government in the 
2012 labour market reform. As pointed out by interviewees, this caused perplexity not only 
among trade unions, but also employers, who could not understand why the Government had 
not taken AENC II into consideration. 
The reform adopted by the Government in April 2012 therefore introduced certain important 
changes in collective bargaining mere days after the conclusion of AENC II. More 
specifically, it opened the door to unilateral changes in working conditions by the employer, 
including wages, and reduced the period required for the notification of such decisions to 
employees. Employers were also given greater powers to take unilateral decisions on issues 
relating to collective redundancies.  
Another area in which the role of employers in regulating working conditions was extended 
was the temporary non-application of the collective agreement in relation to a number of 
issues, with a significant relaxation of the conditions under which this can occur (Castro, 
2012). Employers can accordingly decide temporarily not to apply the terms of the collective 
agreement whenever profits fall for six consecutive months (Sanguineti, 2014). Figure 7 
shows that the reform has triggered a significant increase in the number of cases of non-
application of collective agreements, even though the economic situation was more 
favourable in 2013 than 2012. Around 90 per cent of cases of the non-application of 
company agreements related to wage issues (CCNC, 2013). 
Figure 7: Workers affected by the temporary non-application of the collective agreement by the 
employer, 2012-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales. Data for 2015, collective agreements registered up to November 2015. 
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One of the most contested characteristics of collective bargaining in Spain, the so-called 
ultraactividad of collective agreements (the extension of the terms of a collective agreement, 
even after its expiry, whenever the trade unions and employers have failed to conclude a new 
agreement), was reformed by establishing a two-year limit for the negotiation of a new 
agreement. If no new agreement is finally concluded, workers in those companies will be 
covered by a higher-level agreement and, if there is no higher-level agreement, by the terms 
established in the law. 
Finally, a very important issue regulated in the 2012 reform is the structure of collective 
bargaining. The reform not only confirms the priority given to company agreements, but it 
also prohibits higher-level agreements from including clauses establishing their prevalence 
over lower-level agreements. In other words, the reform reduces the regulatory and 
governance capacity of sectoral agreements in the collective bargaining system.  
Interviews with officials of trade unions and employers’ organizations reveal a shared 
concern about the impact of the 2012 labour market reform on the future dynamic of social 
dialogue. In particular, they share the view that both the manner in which the reform was 
approved (ignoring an earlier agreement by unions and employers), and its content, which 
involves a change with regard to the existing institutional consensus, constitute an important 
obstacle to the restoration of tripartite social dialogue. According to the trade unions, the 
way in which the reform was adopted, with the lack of consideration shown by the 
Government for social dialogue and the views of the social partners on key issues, 
undermines the Government’s credibility and any offers it may make to the social partners. 
With reference to the contents of the reform, the social partners consider that, by unilaterally 
changing the rules of the game in industrial relations and collective bargaining, the 
Government has eroded the governability of collective bargaining and, by extension, the role 
of the social partners. 
3.2 Post-crisis developments in collective bargaining 
The unilateral 2012 reform has not only made it more difficult to renew some collective 
agreements, but more generally has also affected social dialogue between trade unions and 
employers’ confederations. This became clear during the negotiation of a new inter-
confederal agreement on employment and collective bargaining in 2014, in which more 
difficulties were encountered than for any of its predecessors. Moreover, during the period 
between the signing of the January 2012 bipartite AENC II and the July 2015 bipartite AENC 
III, only one agreement was concluded for the negotiated extension of collective agreements 
upon expiry.   
The May 2013 agreement on ‘ultraactividad’ 
In May 2013, in the monitoring committee of AENC II, the trade unions and employers’ 
organizations undertook to speed up the process of renewing collective agreements. 40 They 
also agreed to negotiate extensions of collective agreements while discussions were being 
held on their renewal. In this way, they tried to avoid the conflicts that had started to emerge 
concerning the renewal of certain sectoral collective agreements. As the 2012 reform limited 
to one year the duration of the collective agreement following expiry only in cases where 
the agreement did not contain any specific clause on this matter, the agreement concluded 
by the trade unions and employers in May 2013 recommended the inclusion of such clauses 
in new collective agreements. Where no such clause had been included and the collective 
 
40  Acuerdo de la Comisión de Seguimiento del II Acuerdo para el empleo y la negociación colectiva 
sobre ultraactividad de los convenios colectivos, See: http://boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-
2013-6449 
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agreement had expired, the social partners recommended that the unions and employers sign 
an ad hoc agreement guaranteeing the validity of the collective agreement during 
negotiations. 
Recent data on collective agreements show that 50.6 per cent of collective agreements (out 
of a sample of 2053) in 2014 contained a limit on their duration upon expiry. Of these, 70 
per cent adopted the one-year limit established in the 2012 reform, and the remaining 30 per 
cent called of negotiated extensions of between one and three years. The 49.4 percent of 
collective agreements analysed contained a clause extending their duration until the 
conclusion of a new agreement, therefore maintaining ultraactividad. This clearly shows the 
implementation problems faced by unilateral reforms, particularly when the social partners 
negotiate clauses that are in contradiction with those contained in the law.  
The 2015 bi-partite agreement on employment and 
collective bargaining 
More recently, the social partners have managed to renew the inter-confederal agreement on 
employment and collective bargaining. Negotiations started in December 2014, but in 
comparison with previous bipartite agreements, it proved more difficult to reach consensus 
among the social partners. The most important obstacle in the negotiations was wage 
increases, as the trade unions and employers’ organizations maintained their polarized 
positions. In particular, the trade unions called for wage increases not lower than 1 per cent, 
while the employers’ organizations considered it important to continue wage moderation 
with wage increases of below 0.5 per cent. Another important issue was the inclusion of 
automatic indexation mechanisms in collective agreements. Finally, the issue of the 
automatic extension of collective agreements (ultraactividad) was also covered by the 
negotiations, with the trade unions asking employers to guarantee ultraactividad, contrary 
to the provisions of the 2012 labour market reform. 41  The unions asked the employers for 
another agreement on this specific issue to accompany AENC III. An agreement was finally 
concluded consisting of wage increases of 1 per cent for 2015 and 1.5 per cent for 2016. The 
agreement also contained guidelines to reinforce the role of national sectoral collective 
agreements. However, no agreement was concluded on ultraactividad, as the employers 
considered the agreement already signed in May 2013 on this issue to be sufficient. 
3.3 Articulation between sectoral and company 
agreements  
The articulation between sectoral and company agreements was first regulated by the social 
partners in 1997 based on two principles. The first was the clear definition of issues to be 
dealt with at each level to avoid duplication, and the second was the primacy of sectoral 
collective agreements in regulating working conditions, with company agreements playing 
a complementary role in cases where there were no sectoral collective agreements, or in 
improving the conditions contained in sectoral agreements. The 2011 reform gave regulatory 
priority to company agreements where they are concluded by the social partners. More 
recently, the 2012 reform confirmed the priority of company agreements over sectoral 
agreements, without the possibility for the social partners to agree on different terms.  
Even though it is probably too early for a proper assessment of the institutional and long-
term effects of the changes outlined in section II, there are some indications confirming their 
significance. The most important relate to the capacity of collective bargaining to provide 
additional protection for workers. The 2012 reform introduced two main elements limiting 
this role. The first is the capacity of the employer to unilaterally modify the working 
 
41  See El País, 24 March 2015. 
 34  
conditions of employees, as set out in the collective agreement. Indeed, there was a 
remarkable increase in cases of the unilateral non-application of collective agreements 
immediately following the reform. Second, the non-extension of collective agreements upon 
their expiry also implies that many workers may be left without the additional protection 
provided by collective agreements, with their working conditions then being determined by 
the legal minimum standards established in the Workers’ Charter. There is some evidence 
of the use of delaying tactics by employers to allow collective agreements to expire and to 
block negotiations with workers on new collective agreements (see Section IV). However, a 
recent report by the tripartite National Advisory Board on Collective Bargaining (CCNC, 
2014) shows that a diversity of means are being used by employers and workers’ 
representatives to negotiate the temporary extension of collective agreements upon expiry, 
while engaging in the negotiation of a new agreement.  
3.4 Coordination of collective bargaining  
The main instruments for the coordination of collective bargaining in Spain remain the peak 
bipartite inter-sectoral agreements on employment and collective bargaining. These 
agreements not only provide general guidelines on wage increases (see Table 6), but also 
contain recommendations on other collective bargaining issues, including the articulation 
between levels in the collective bargaining structure and internal flexibility. The 
recommendation contained in AENC III (2012-2014), concluded in January 2012, is 
particularly important in emphasizing the need to include aspects related to flexicurity in 
collective agreements, so that greater functional flexibility is accompanied by mechanisms 
guaranteeing the effective protection of employees. 
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Table 6: Coordination guidelines on wage setting negotiated by the social partners at the peak level in 
collective agreements 
Name of agreement Year  Wage setting guidelines 
Agreement on collective bargaining 2012 2002 Forecast inflation (2%) + Ex post indexation 
Agreement on collective bargaining 2013 2003 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Extension of the 2003 agreement on collective 
bargaining for 2004 
2004 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Agreement on collective bargaining 2005 2005 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Extension of the 2005 agreement on collective 
bargaining for 2006 
2006 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Agreement on collective bargaining 2007 2007 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Extension of the 2007 agreement on collective 
bargaining for 2008 
2008 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
 2009 Forecast inflation (2%) + Productivity + Ex post 
indexation 
Interconfederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2010, 2011 and 
2012 (AENC I) 
2010 1% 
 2011 1-2% 
Interconfederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2012, 2013 and 
2014 (AENC II) 
2012 1.5-2.5% (AENC I); 0.5% + Wage indexation clause 
resulting from the difference between the inflation 
registered and the ECB inflation criteria of 2% (AENC 
II) 
 2013 0.6% + Wage indexation clause resulting from the 
difference between the inflation registered and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) inflation criteria of 2% 
 2014 0.6% if GDP growth in 2013 below 1%; 1% if GDP 
growth in 2013 between 1 and 2%; 1.5% (maximum) if 
GDP growth in 2013 above 2% 
Interconfederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining 2015, 2016 and 
2017 (AENC III) 
2015 1% maximum 
 
2016 1.5% maximum 
Source: authors’ elaboration  
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Even though the peak bipartite inter-sectoral agreements on collective bargaining only 
provide general guidelines, they have played a particularly important role in wage setting. 
In particular, they have contributed to the implementation of a policy of wage moderation, 
while at the same time introducing new criteria for wage setting. For example, AENC II used 
the European Central Bank inflation forecast as a benchmark for calculating the ex-post 
revision of wages. Partly as a result, negotiated wage increases showed a downward trend 
during the crisis, with the sole exception of 2011 (Figure 8). It can also be observed that in 
2013 there was a sharper fall in wage increases negotiated at the company level compared 
to the sectoral level. Even though company agreements do tend to contain more moderate 
wage settlements than sectoral agreements, the 2013 figure probably reflects the changes 
introduced in the 2012 reform. 
Figure 8: Negotiated wage increases by collective bargaining level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
3.5 Post-crisis developments in collective bargaining: Declining 
coverage and decentralization 
In the post-crisis period, the two main trends that have characterized collective bargaining 
since the beginning of the crisis have continued. First, there has been a downward trend in 
the number of agreements and workers covered (see Section IV). Second, the more 
qualitative aspect of the decentralization of collective bargaining has been intensified as a 
result of the priority given to company level bargaining by the 2012 reform and the capacity 
of employers not to apply the terms agreed in sectoral agreements.  
As indicated above, the effect of the 2012 reform on the decentralization of collective 
bargaining is mostly qualitative, as it gives priority to company agreements over sectoral 
agreements and empowers employers to opt out from or not to apply sectoral agreements 
(Cruz et al., 2014). As shown by Figure 9, the effect of decentralization has not been very 
significant in quantitative terms. Nevertheless, despite this quantitative stability, the 
relationship between company and sectoral agreements experienced a radical reversal after 
2012.  
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No attempt has been made by the government to restore collective bargaining to its original 
level. There has been no other reform of industrial relations or collective bargaining since 
February 2012. The views of trade unions, employers and the Government remain polarized 
on this issue, as shown by the interviews. On the one hand, the trade unions consider that the 
effects of the 2012 labour market reform have been very negative, including the extension 
of precarious jobs and the erosion of collective bargaining (UGT, 2014; Cruz et al., 2014). 42  
They therefore expect a new government to abolish the 2012 reform and negotiate a new 
reform with the social partners. Employers are in general satisfied with the results of the 
2012 reform (CEOE, 2012), but have recently called for further steps in the direction of the 
2012 reform. Finally, in 2013, the Government undertook an assessment of the impact of the 
2012 reform on the labour market and collective bargaining (MEYSS, 2013), 43  which 
conveyed a very positive general message.   
 
 
42  See, for instance, the paper prepared by the UGT assessing the impact of the reform on collective 
bargaining: http://portal.ugt.org/actualidad/2015/abril/boletin21/002-doc.pdf 
43http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/destacados/HOME/impacto_reforma_laboral/Report_evaluating_the
_impact_of_the_Labour_Reform.pdf 
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Section IV. Effects on the labour market and industrial relations  
4.1 Active and passive employment policies 
The economic recovery was accompanied by a job creation process characterized by the 
precarious nature of the new jobs. There are two factors behind the higher level of precarity. 
On the one hand, there was a reduction in the average length of temporary contracts during 
the crisis. Accordingly, compared to the pre-crisis period, temporary contracts in Spain are 
now shorter on average, and therefore more precarious. The high turnover that characterizes 
the Spanish labour market has consequently increased further, with around two million 
people every quarter moving from employment to unemployment, or vice versa. On the 
other, there has been an increase in part-time employment, which remains highly feminized 
and mostly involuntary (Alós, 2015).  
Despite this situation, there has been a decline in the coverage of passive employment policy 
measures. By the end of 2014, only 20 per cent of the unemployed were receiving 
contributory unemployment benefits, with another 24 per cent receiving an assistance benefit 
of 426 euros, an amount that is clearly insufficient to maintain the unemployed and their 
families at a minimally acceptable level, if only because of the high rate of long-term 
unemployed. Paradoxically, the resources for unemployment benefits started to decrease in 
2008, with a more pronounced decline since 2012, when the trend should have been the 
opposite. Compared with other EU-28 countries, expenditure on passive unemployment 
protection policy measures per point of unemployment is about 40 per cent lower in Spain, 
with the EU-28 average being 0.18 per cent of GDP, compared with 0.11 per cent in Spain 
(Miguelez, 2015) 
In terms of active labour market policy measures, a new model has been implemented in 
Spain during the crisis through the so-called Annual Plan for Employment Policy (PAPE) of 
2013 and the Spanish Strategy for Employment Activation, 2014-2016. The most innovative 
characteristic of these plans is the fact that the financing of the active policies implemented 
by the regions depends in part on an evaluation of their results. The Plan also rationalizes 
programme design, linking it to specific targets. On the negative side, there has been some 
re-centralization in the design and implementation of the programmes. It would therefore be 
desirable to achieve greater decentralization, so that the lower territorial levels can better 
define the specific measures appropriate to their needs. 
But the most important feature of active labour market policies during the crisis was the 
decline in financial resources. In comparison with 2007, the resources available fell by 50 
per cent in 2013 and 2014. Within active labour market policies, training for the unemployed 
has suffered major budget cuts that have very significantly affected the number of course 
participants, falling from 1,282,458 in 2008 to 301,350 in 2014. The only exception is 
continuous training, with the number of employed persons receiving it rising from 1.5 
million in 2008 to almost 2.5 million in 2014. However, these figures have to be treated with 
caution, as a single employee may participate in several training courses (Lope, 2015).  
Hiring incentives, traditionally the main instrument of active employment policy in Spain, 
have been central to the debate, because of their importance within the total resources 
allocated for active labour market policies, but also because of design issues. These policies 
have undergone a profound transformation, accelerated during the years of economic crisis, 
involving their rationalization and re-organization, the near disappearance of incentives for 
the transformation of temporary into permanent contracts and the strengthening of incentives 
for self-employment. With regard to hiring incentives, despite positive developments in 
terms of rationalization (contributing to minimizing the deadweight loss effect), there has 
been an increase recently, with the number of contracts benefiting from such incentives 
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rising from 3 per cent in 2013 to nearly 16 per cent between March 2014 and July 2015 
(Molina, 2015). In overall terms, despite some positives, there remain significant problems, 
including the weak conditionality for companies benefiting from financial incentives to hire 
workers and their weak relationship with training policies.  
The situation of youth and women has received special attention in recent years in the context 
of employment policies. The position of young people in the Spanish labour market is 
characterized by high levels of unemployment and temporary employment. Two initiatives 
have been launched to address these problems: the Strategy for Entrepreneurship and Youth 
Employment, 2013-2016; and the National Youth Guarantee System. Both initiatives 
emphasize the promotion of employment (through hiring incentives), self-employment and 
entrepreneurship. However, neither policy appears to have had a significant impact on job 
creation, especially in terms of stable and high quality jobs (Rodríguez-Soler and Verd, 
2015). In the case of women, significant difficulties have been encountered in achieving 
quantitative employment targets, despite the significant growth of part-time work, mostly by 
women. Moreover, there have been hardly any policy measures to address the pay gap or 
occupational segregation (Carrasquer, 2015). 
4.2 Changes in the collective agreements signed, the rise/fall in industrial 
action and strengthened/weakened or loss of autonomy for the social 
partners  
Before analysing changes in the number of collective agreements and workers covered, a 
methodological comment is required. The way in which data on collective agreements are 
collected in Spain means that information is available on both the number of collective 
agreements with regulatory effect and the number of workers covered in a given year, as 
well as the number of collective agreements concluded every year, irrespective of whether 
they will also have regulatory effect the following years. 44  The first type of data allows a 
stock-taking exercise and can be used to assess long-term trends. In contrast, the second type 
of data provides a more dynamic perspective on the evolution of collective bargaining year 
by year. 
  
 
44  The social partners and scholars have repeatedly criticized the deficiencies of statistics on 
collective bargaining, and have asked for improvements in both the methodology and processing of 
data. See, for instance, CES, 2015, p. 135, and García and Jansen, 2015. 
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Figure 9: Number of collective agreements with regulatory effect in a given year  45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MYESS, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
As noted earlier, one of the main effects of the crisis on collective bargaining has been a fall 
in the number of collective agreements concluded, as well as in the number of workers 
covered. Even though consolidated data are only available until 2012, 46 there is a clear 
declining trend (see Figure 9). This fall was particularly intense in the case of company level 
agreements, due to the closure and/or downsizing of some companies. Long-term employer 
strategies of the externalization and fragmentation of production structures, expectably 
reinforced during the crisis, are also likely to have contributed to this trend. In the case of 
sectoral agreements, the decrease probably reflects the difficulties encountered in many 
sectors in renewing collective agreements. The 2012 reform, by suppressing the automatic 
temporary extension of collective agreements, may have reinforced this trend.  
Nevertheless, there has been a recovery since 2013 in the number of collective agreements. 
This upturn is not only linked to the improvement in the economic and labour market 
situation, but may also be the result of the incentives offered by the 2012 labour market 
reform, which gave priority to company over sectoral agreements. In the pre-2012 reform 
context, many companies that could have had their own collective agreement, preferred not 
to because of the transaction costs of bargaining and the fact that, despite the company 
agreement, the sectoral agreement would prevail anyway. But in the new context, an 
increasing number of employers may find it more favourable to negotiate their own 
collective agreement, as it may allow them to deviate from the provisions of sectoral 
agreements. As clearly shown in Table 7, the increase in the number of agreements in 2013 
and 2014 can almost entirely be explained by the appearance of new bargaining units (or in 
other words, new collective agreements) and of new companies with their own agreement.  
 
45  For instance, a three-year collective agreement may be signed in 2010, but has effects in 2011 and 
2012. 
46  Due to the methodology used to register collective agreements, including both new agreements 
and revisions/extensions of earlier ones, fully reliable and consolidated data are available with a two-
year time lag. This means that data for 2013, and particularly 2014, are still preliminary and will 
change in the coming months. 
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Table 7: Collective agreements signed each year by level, 2011 - 2014 
      Existing bargaining units       New bargaining units  
 Total Company Group of 
companies 
Sector Total Company Group of 
companies 
Sector 
2011 1365 1035 25 305 264 241 4 19 
2012 1588 1247 35 306 342 327 11 0 
2013 2505 1899 55 551 664 627 20 17 
2014 1837 1503 42 292 606 573 17 16 
Source: MEYSS, Estadísticas de Convenios Colectivos 
It is therefore possible to argue that there has been a quantitative recovery since 2013 in the 
number of collective agreements concluded, although it is still too early to assess whether 
this trend will be consolidated in the coming years. The tensions arising after the 2012 labour 
market and collective bargaining reform still persist, particularly concerning the renewal of 
agreements signed before then (CES, 2015). However, there was a 4.5 per cent decline 
between 2007 and 2013 in the number of workers covered by collective agreements. The 
decrease was much more marked in the case of workers covered by company agreements, 
where there was a 19.5 per cent decline between 2007 and 2013. In contrast, the number of 
workers covered by sectoral agreements only fell by 2.7 per cent.  
Figure 10: Number of workers covered by collective agreements 
 
Source: MEYSS, Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
In terms of bargaining dynamics on a year-by-year basis, there has been a very clear fall in 
the number of workers covered, caused almost exclusively by a decline in the number of 
collective agreements renewed, as the number of new collective agreements and workers 
covered has increased (see Table 8). However, even though there has been a significant 
increase in the number of new collective agreements at the company level (that is, new 
agreements signed in companies where there was previously no collective agreement), rising 
from 451 new collective agreements in 2010 covering 144,600 workers to 753 new collective 
agreements in 2014 covering 137,539 workers, this is probably due to the lower average size 
of companies with collective agreements. This tends to confirm the hypothesis that the 
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collective bargaining reforms offer greater incentives for companies to negotiate their own 
collective agreement even when they have no previous history of this.  
Table 8: Renewed and new collective agreements and number of workers covered, 2010-2014 
Renewed collective agreements 
 Company Sectoral Total (Company + sectoral) 
    
Year Collective 
agreements 
Workers Collective 
agreements 
Workers Collective 
agreements 
Workers 
2010 1,486 318,547 613 5,752,016 2,099 6,070,563 
2011 1415 367,298 526 4,742,668 1,941 5,109,966 
2012 1,462 522,521 505 3,876,834 1,967 4,399,355 
2013 368 152,647 298 3,087,312 666 3,239,959 
2014 502 198,413 314 3,113,860 816 3,312,273 
 
 
New collective agreements 
 Company Sectoral Total (Company + sectoral) 
    
Year Collective 
agreements 
Workers Collective 
agreements 
Workers Collective 
agreements 
Workers 
2010 451 144,600 154 877,929 605 1,022,529 
2011 457 151,173 134 1,006,286 591 1,157,459 
2012 517 122,908 127 1,556,161 644 1,679,069 
2013 813 187,002 212 1,613,584 1,025 1,800,586 
2014 753 137,539 159 1,306,160 912 1,443,699 
Source: MEYSS, Estadística de Convenios Colectivos 
From the above data it can be concluded that the 2012 labour market reform is having a very 
significant impact on the structure and dynamics of collective bargaining in Spain. A trend 
can be seen towards the decentralization of collective bargaining as company collective 
agreements are given priority over sectoral agreements for the regulation of working 
conditions. In terms of collective bargaining dynamics, the 2012 reform has made it much 
more difficult to renew existing collective agreements. Between 2012 and 2013, the number 
of company agreements renewed fell from 1,462 to 368. In the case of collective agreements 
above the company level, the decrease was also important, falling from 505 in 2012 to 298 
in 2013. The trade unions interviewed attributed this trend to the effect of the 2012 labour 
market reform, and particularly the suppression of ultraactividad. This has acted as an 
incentive for many employers to simply let old collective agreements expire without 
renewing them. 
But, over and above the quantitative indicators of the number of collective agreements and 
workers covered, emphasis needs to be placed on the qualitative changes introduced by the 
2012 reform in terms of the characteristics of collective agreements. In particular, it can 
certainly be confirmed that the main impact of the labour market reforms during the crisis 
has been the erosion of the regulatory and protective capacity of collective agreements. The 
issue is not therefore so much how many collective agreements have been concluded, or 
even how many workers are formally covered by them, but to what extent those collective 
agreements provide additional effective protection to employees. Even though the 
predominance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Spain has been identified 
by some authors as a hindrance to the effectiveness of collective agreements (due to the lack 
of workers’ representation structures in most SMEs), the changes introduced in 2012 opened 
up a new scenario in which it is legal for employers to decide unilaterally decide on a 
temporary basis not to apply the terms of collective agreements. 
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The number of strikes in Spain has increased since the beginning of the economic crisis. In 
2007, there were 751 economic strikes, rising to a peak in 2009 (1001 strikes) and 2013 (994 
strikes). This is also borne out by the number of work days lost (Figure 11), which has 
displayed a long-term downward trend. However, in the context of the crisis, there was an 
initial increase, followed by another peak in 2012.  
Figure 11: Number of work days lost (excluding general strikes), 1986 - 2014 
 
Source: MEYSS, Estadística de Huelgas y Cierres Patronales 
Behind this apparent stability during the crisis, there are some very important qualitative 
changes in industrial conflict. The most important one for the purposes of the present report 
is related to the causes of conflict. As a result of the extension of non-judicial conflict 
resolution mechanisms and the coordinating role of peak agreements in collective 
bargaining, the number of strikes arising out of collective bargaining issues (interpretation, 
renewal, etc.) had been following a declining trend (see Figure 12). Despite the crisis, this 
downward trend continued from 2008 until 2012. However, since 2012, the trend has 
reversed and the number of conflicts relating to collective bargaining have increased 
steadily. This can certainly be attributed to the impact of the 2012 reform on collective 
bargaining dynamics, and particularly the breakdown of the framework autonomously 
determined by social partners.  
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Figure 12: Percentage of conflicts motivated by collective bargaining issues, 2012-2014 
 
Source: MEYSS, Estadística de Huelgas y Cierres Patronales 
4.3 The changing role of the State in industrial relations 
In terms of the autonomy of the social partners in relation to State regulation, the 
developments in industrial relations in Spain are a clear illustration of the contradictions 
inherent to an industrial relations system in which the State plays a strong role (Molina, 
2014). The social partners, and the trade unions in particular, have worked hard to 
consolidate strong autonomous collective bargaining institutions. The efforts made since the 
mid-1990s were particularly important in this regard in strengthening collective bargaining 
at the sectoral level with a view to consolidating a top-down mechanism of organized 
decentralization. Peak bipartite agreements on collective bargaining, conflict resolution and 
lifelong learning have also contributed to enhancing the coordination and autonomous 
governance of industrial relations. However, the reiterated unilateral regulation of aspects of 
industrial relations by the State during the crisis, together with the enhanced capacity of 
employers to unilaterally change working conditions, irrespective of the collective 
agreements concluded, have resulted in a loss of autonomy by the social partners 
Some of the policies implemented during the economic crisis have triggered a recalibration 
of the role of the State in industrial relations. In particular, the regulation of industrial 
relations and collective bargaining, an area historically reserved for the social partners, was 
carried out unilaterally by the State in 2011 and 2012.  
However, the involvement of the State in the regulation of industrial relations and collective 
bargaining is not new in Spain. From a procedural viewpoint, a pre-condition for the 
renegotiation of industrial relations laws in the 1990s and early 2000s was the active 
involvement of the State, although in different ways and to different degrees. Following 
unilateral intervention in 1994, the State played a guidance role and engaged in mediation 
to facilitate agreement between unions and employers, for example in 1997 (Molina, 2007).  
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Contrary to the reforms in the 1990s and 2000s, the aim of which was to enhance collective 
self-regulation by retrenching the law and opening greater spaces for company level 
bargaining under the umbrella of industry-level agreements, the most recent regulations, and 
particularly the 2012 reform, have reduced these spaces.  
In the case of wage setting, developments during the economic crisis also show the tensions 
that exist between collective self-regulation and State regulation. In the 1980s, there was a 
clear move towards the consolidation of autonomous wage setting in the private sector, based 
on peak inter-confederal coordination. Even though the State was the main actor behind the 
wage pacts of the early 1980s, the conflict between trade unions and the Socialist 
government hindered any attempt to replicate incomes policy agreements. Following a 
number of years of uncoordinated wage bargaining and decentralization, wage-setting has 
been characterized since the late 1990s by truly autonomous inter-confederal coordination 
through peak bipartite agreements concluded on an annual basis by the most representative 
trade unions and employers’ organizations. The economic crisis seemed to result in a 
temporary interruption in this practice, as the trade unions and employers’ organizations 
failed to reach agreement on the guidelines for collective bargaining in 2009. However, a 
new agreement was concluded in 2010 and renewed in 2012 and 2015. All of the agreements 
included a strong commitment to wage moderation, as well as to the autonomous regulation 
of collective bargaining.  
Finally, another impact of the crisis and austerity measures has been a move back to 
unilateral State regulation of working conditions in the public sector. In 2008 and 2009, 
wage increases for civil servants were agreed in the General Bargaining Forum. The wages 
and wage increases of salaried employees for 2008 and 2009 were negotiated in the second 
collective agreement for salaried employees 2006-2008 and the third collective agreement 
for salaried employees 2009. The two agreements established that the same increases 
negotiated for civil servants should be applied to salaried employees. In contrast, between 
2010 and 2015, pay increases for public sector employees were imposed unilaterally. 
In overall terms, these developments show the fragility of collective self-regulation in 
countries with statist traditions under the external pressures of economic adjustment. Despite 
the consolidation of collective bargaining by the social partners and the reduction in conflict 
rates, the State still plays the role of coordinator and regulator of last resort, as has become 
clear in the recent economic crisis. 
There have been some attempts by the social partners to rebuild and revitalize their 
regulatory capacity and autonomy at both the intersectoral and sectoral levels. These 
attempts have taken the form of bipartite peak inter-sectoral agreements on employment and 
collective bargaining. There is some evidence for the resilience of pre-crisis collective 
bargaining dynamics and the capacity of the social partners to adapt to the new framework. 
For instance, bipartite social dialogue has continued during the crisis and has contributed to 
increased awareness of the need to enhance the capacity of collective agreements to adapt to 
changing conditions through internal flexibility. Moreover, the implementation of some of 
the most controversial clauses in the 2012 reform is being negotiated, hence reducing their 
potentially disruptive impact. Although the long-term impact of the recent changes remains 
to be seen, it is becoming clear that, in non-coordinated economies, the social partners face 
challenges in consolidating a strong self-regulatory system.  
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Conclusion 
This analysis of social dialogue in Spain has shed light on the contrast between tripartite and 
bipartite (union–employer) dynamics in the post-crisis period. Although tripartite social 
dialogue has struggled to achieve revitalization, and there have been very few advances in 
this regard, bipartite social dialogue between trade unions and employers remains a defining 
trait of industrial relations in Spain and a source of stability and coordination in collective 
bargaining. Indeed, the only best practice identified by interviewees was the negotiation of 
bipartite agreements and the attempts made by the trade unions and employers to mitigate 
the potentially disruptive effects of the 2012 reform on issues such as ultraactividad.  
Based on the evidence presented in this report, it is difficult to talk of a revitalization of 
tripartite social dialogue. There were still unilateral interventions of the State in 2015 in 
aspects that have traditionally been regulated and managed by the trade unions and 
employers, such as the vocational training system. The non-institutionalized dimension of 
tripartite social dialogue therefore remains weak, with few signs of recovery. 
Institutionalized tripartite social dialogue in the Economic and Social Council has not 
experienced any marked change in its functioning, composition or impact. The Council 
remains an advisory body with very little impact on the negotiation or implementation of 
recovery policies. However, this institution has been identified as a potential target of 
austerity policies in fiscal consolidation packages, as a result of which several regional 
Economic and Social Councils have been abolished. Nevertheless, there have been some 
attempts to revitalize the role of the Economic and Social Council through the adoption of a 
more proactive approach to its policy advisory role. 
In light of the above, the future of tripartite social dialogue in Spain remains very uncertain. 
The economic recovery has not been accompanied by a revitalization of social dialogue, 
except in certain isolated cases on very specific issues. The exclusion of the social partners 
from policy making, even in aspects that have historically been within their competence, has 
persisted, despite the improvement in the national economic situation.  
Even though bipartism has continued to deliver collective bargaining agreements, the trend 
towards a gradual narrowing of social dialogue to industrial relations issues should constitute 
a matter of concern for trade unions and employers’ organizations alike, as their role has 
been reduced to a limited number of concerns with a strong distributional component. 
Moreover, when the erosion of the regulatory capacity of multi-employer collective 
bargaining and the governability of industrial relations by the social partners is taken into 
consideration, the narrowing of social dialogue becomes particularly worrying. On the one 
hand, this erosion may further contribute to the exclusion of the social partners from policy 
making. On the other, despite its resilience, bipartite social dialogue has been facing more 
obstacles since 2012.  
The abandonment of tripartite social dialogue, together with the erosion of collective 
bargaining, has been accompanied by an increase in social inequality. Even though it is not 
possible to know the exact contribution of these changes to the increased inequality, it is 
clear that both the decentralization and the declining coverage of collective bargaining have 
resulted in increased wage disparities. The enhanced unilateral capacity of employers is 
another factor favouring greater wage disparities.  
The crisis of tripartite social dialogue has a strong ideological and political component. The 
hope expressed by the trade unions concerning the possibility of revitalizing tripartite social 
dialogue so that it can play an effective role in post-crisis recovery is closely linked to a 
change of government in the recent general elections. However, the real challenge for the 
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social partners and social dialogue is to recover a more important role in policy making. The 
gradual narrowing of tripartite social dialogue to labour market issues not only diminishes 
its capacity to provide a basis for sustainable growth, but also diminishes the legitimacy of 
the social partners. 
The revitalization of tripartite social dialogue first requires acknowledgment by the public 
authorities of the important role of the social partners in certain policy areas. One of these is 
rising income disparities, where the social partners have some capacity to intervene through 
collective bargaining. The significant rise in earnings and income inequality in Spain over 
the course of the crisis may well jeopardize future growth by reducing domestic demand. An 
incomes pact, focusing on the reduction of inequality rather than just on wage moderation, 
is desirable and would benefit the recovery. Other policy issues on which social dialogue 
would be useful include social exclusion and the long-term unemployed. 
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Annex: List of interviews 
Name Position Place 
Mr. Joan Pujol Secretary General of Foment del Treball Nacional Barcelona 
Mr. Francisco González de Lena Head of Cabinet of Economic and Social Council President Madrid 
Mr. Ignacio Fernández Toxo Secretary General of CCOO Madrid 
Mr. Camil Ros (*) UGT Catalunya Barcelona 
Mrs. Ann Westman Economic Advisor - European Semester Officer in Madrid Madrid 
Mr. Juergen Foecking Head of Political Sector – Permanent Representation of the 
European Commission in Spain 
Madrid 
Mrs. Cristina Faciaben (*) Socio-economic Secretary, CCOO Catalunya Barcelona 
Mr. Jesús Barroso Barrero (*) General Director of Active Labour Market Policies, Public 
Employment Service of Spain 
Madrid 
(*) Interviews conducted between September 2014 and June 2015 for the Project “The Socioeconomic Diagnosis of Employment 
Policies in Spain 2012-2014”” 
